

THE BORDERS OF CONFLICT:  
THREE ESSAYS ON BORDER MANAGEMENT AND CONFLICT ESCALATION

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Why do some states escalate territorial disputes while other states ignore or actively resolve their territorial claims? Why do some states choose to diplomatically close their borders with a neighboring state, or to build a physical fence? Some states unilaterally close and reopen their borders multiple times during conflicts. Why do they pursue what appears on its face to be an inconsistent border management strategy? This dissertation addresses these questions.

The first essay argues that differing domestic intuitions cause some states to view territorial conflict as either more or less threatening overall. A large-N analysis of all territorial disputes between 1945 and 2007 reveals that military regimes are especially likely to escalate territorial disputes, while personalist dictators are unwilling to do so for fear of emboldening coup-plotters.

The second essay analyzes all border closures and border fence construction between 1980 and 2011. It employs an original dataset and large-N analysis to demonstrate that, contrary to previous research, civil wars cause states to alter their border management techniques. It further provides a unified theory explaining why states pursue short term strategies like border closures when faced with some threats, and build physical fences when confronted by longer term challenges.

The final paper observes that diplomatic border closures are especially likely during civil wars, and analyzes the border opening and closing behaviors of neighboring states

during these conflicts. It presents a game theoretic model to illustrate that this pattern of intermittent closure and opening occurs when a refugee-receiving state attempts to extort additional international aid from the international community by endangering refugees. It then analyzes the implications of these models on two cases: Tanzania during the Burundi/Rwandan conflict and Macedonia during the Kosovo war.

## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Katrina Browne is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Cornell University. In August 2017, she will receive a Ph.D., with a concentration in International Relations and Comparative Politics. Her work focuses on state conflict over the location and management of international borders. Dr. Browne graduated *Summa Cum Laude* with a Bachelors of Arts in Political Science from Wellesley College in 2009. During the 2012-2013 academic year, she studied advanced game theory and statistics as an Exchange Scholar at Harvard University's Department of Government.

Dr. Browne won several nationally competitive fellowships and scholarships to pursue her studies. These include a National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship and Wellesley College's Vida Dutton Scudder Fellowship. In addition to her substantive work on border conflict, she won scholarships to receive advanced statistics training at the University of Michigan, Princeton University's Empirical Implications of Theoretical Model program, and the University of Essex's Summer School in Social Science Data Analysis. She currently serves as a data science consultant for Cornell Outdoor Education, where she assists in increasing their profitability and customer engagement.

For Ellen, Surekha, Katherine, Francesca, Carly, and Cindy:  
Strong women who have each helped me find my own strength

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Professors Jessica Weeks, Jessica Weiss, and Thomas Pepinsky further helped make this dissertation a reality. These scholars all model careful quantitative scholarship while answering important questions within International Relations and Comparative Politics. The growing trend within the discipline is sadly to sacrifice substance for causal inference. These scholars demonstrate that big questions and causal inference can go hand-in-hand.

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## PAPER 1

### BORDERING AUTOCRATS:

#### *MILITARIZED DISPUTES, TERRITORY, AND AUTOCRAT REGIME TYPE*

##### **Introduction**

Which regime type is the most belligerent? A diverse literature points to the relative peacefulness of democracies. However, the field has no consensus on which type of regime produces the most violence internationally. A growing line of inquiry notes that variations of autocracies resort to war at differing rates. But this literature is deeply divided over which internal political structures lead to more conflict. One side focuses on personalist dictatorships as the predominant source of conflict. They argue that dictators like Idi Amin and Saddam Hussein have few constraints preventing them from attacking other states. Others attribute militarized disputes to the bellicosity of military regimes. These scholars point to the presence of unchecked military institutions in juntas like Argentina and Cyprus to explain the Falklands War and Cyprus Dispute, among others.

I argue that different regime types escalate conflicts at varying rates according to each conflict's central issue. Focusing on territorial claims, I hypothesize that military regimes have unique incentives which drive them to fight more border wars. Terrestrial warfare requires strong, professional armies and gives juntas an opportunity to reward their core supporters while fighting conflicts with relatively clear military objectives. Moreover, territorial claims challenge the identity of military elites as defenders of the national honor. Therefore, leading generals have a vested ideological reason for their high sensitivity to territorial disputes. Conversely, strong militaries threaten the regime survival of personalist dictators. These

autocrats are thus unlikely to engage in conflicts which necessitate building up the armed forces because the largest threat to their power is the possibility of a coup. However, these incentives may flip when autocrats have disagreements over other issues (Way and Weeks, 2014).

If the issue underpinning a dispute differentially structures regimes' incentives to adopt force, findings which point to the belligerency of personalists and governing generals may both be correct. Rather than continuing the debate on whether juntas or dictators are the most warlike, my study of the conflict propensity of different regime types engaged in a territorial dispute points to a more productive avenue of research for the study of international conflict and autocracy. Adopting an issue areas approach, as has been commonly advocated by researchers of territorial conflict, will add nuance to the field's understanding of variation in the use of violence over regime type. Moreover, it will help explain why belligerent regimes choose the fights they do.

This essay consists of four parts. I review the debate over which autocrats use the most force, and discuss the issue areas approach to analyzing conflict. Next, I outline a theoretical explanation linking types of autocracy to differing sensitivity to territorial dispute. I then model the conflict propensity of all directed-dyads between 1945 and 2007 to test for an interaction effect between regime type and the existence of a territorial dispute. I find that military dictatorships have heightened sensitivity to existing territorial disputes and are thus the most likely to escalate these conflicts. In my final section, I address these policy concerns, and discuss how future research examining the interaction between autocracy and other forms of dispute may further advance our understanding of international conflict.

## **State of the Literature**

### ***Regime Type and Militarized Disputes***

While International Relations is just beginning to examine which regime types are the most belligerent, near universal agreement exists over which regime type is the most peaceful. The field treats democracies as singularly pacific governments. The democratic peace findings are so stable that Jack Levy famously noted that the “absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations” (1989,88). No law like formulation exists for predicting whether autocracies will militarize or negotiate a disagreement.

One set of findings argues that personalist regimes destabilize international peace more than other regimes. Weeks and her co-authors observe a pattern of personalists disproportionately fueling violent international confrontations (Weeks 2008; Weeks 2012). In addition to explaining the escalation of most MIDs, personalists also explain the link between revolution and interstate conflict (Colgan and Weeks 2014; Walt 1992). Moreover, personalists disproportionately seek to proliferate weapons of mass destruction as a method for increasing their fighting efficacy without empowering their generals and admirals (Way and Weeks 2014).

Examination of mixed regime dyads further points to the bellicosity of personalists. Reiter and Stam find that personalists are significantly more likely to initiate an attack on a democracy, despite having a low probability of winning these confrontations (2003). Mixed evidence suggests that personalists preferentially target single party regimes (Peceny and Beer 2003).

Other scholars contend that military regimes account for most armed confrontations. Lai and Slater argue that the relationship between personalization of autocracy and belligerency is

spurious (2006). Their data suggests that authoritarian governments with strong and politicized militaries are more likely to initiate conflict. However, Lai and Slater focus on formal institutions. Autocratic regimes frequently feature informal political levers that impact their likelihood of engaging in conflict (Weeks 2012). Likewise, Sechser finds that states which deemphasize civilian control over the military resort to force more often (2004). A military background also predicts that a leader will initiate armed confrontations with others (Horowitz and Stam 2014). This pattern is even stronger in regimes lacking robust civilian control over the armed forces.

Both sides of the debate within the authoritarian conflict research agenda examine aggregate levels of militarization. These studies frequently analyze all MIDs or directed-dyadic MIDs within a particular period. Focusing exclusively on the level of hostilities achieved in a MID skims over the fact that disputes emerge over a variety of issues. Within some confrontations, states disagree over economics or policy. For example, the Football War broke out between Honduras and El Salvador due to contention over immigration. Likewise, Britain waged a transnational battle on the high seas to end the slave trade. Other MIDs develop over territorial questions.

Instigations aside, certain regimes might also be more common targets in conflicts than others. Intervention to change the regime type of an opposing state has driven conflict historically. For instance, the United States mobilized its armed forces during Operation Uphold Democracy to reestablish democracy within Haiti by ousting General Raoul Cedras, who had come to power in a widely condemned coup. Similarly, North and South Korea have come to loggerheads many times over regime differences. Treating these disputes as equivalent

artificially homogenizes conflicts that governments may have different incentives to handle at the negotiating table or on the battlefield.

### ***Issues Approach to Analyzing Conflict***

By recognizing that disputes have heterogeneous origins, the literature on autocratic conflict propensity can synthesize its apparently conflicting findings. Instead of debating which autocrats make the worst neighbors, the field should examine autocratic bellicosity within rather than across issues. For example, personalist regimes may be the most bellicose regime when confronted with one issue area, while military regimes may find another issue areas especially sensitive. Adopting an issue area approach allows scholars to explain why both regime types can prefer violent armed confrontations. As an added benefit, this approach also encourages research into more nuanced questions, such as, “when will a regime type be mostly like to fight?” This essay takes the first step in synthesizing regime-based scholarship and issue area approaches by examining the how sensitive autocratic regimes are to existing territorial disputes.

The core tenant of an issues-based approach is that practical questions ground leaders’ foreign affairs (Hensel et al. 2008; Hensel 2001; Vasquez 1993; Diehl 1992; Mansbach and Vasquez 1981; Keohane and Nye 1977; O’Leary 1976). International Relations theory generally emphasizes abstract concepts like power and national interest when explaining international outcomes, but Holsti critiques this focus. He writes, “Nowhere do we find the issues that excite men’s passions and fears, those stakes that predispose them to take up arms to pursue or defend their causes and purposes...to leave out issues is to leave out the stuff of politics,” (1991, 12). Presidents and dictators alike may want to pursue vague notions like security, but most rulers spend their time addressing specific policy questions. How can my

state fortify its largest riparian border in light of the river shifting channels? How can my state improve its trade balance with country B if they continue to pursue a policy of artificially devaluing their currency? What actions can my state take to prevent foreign sponsored civil society organizations from forming domestically? Foreign policy is, in practice, a portfolio of answers to these and many other questions faced by governing elites (Mitchell and Hensel 2007).

If issues are the stuff of international politics, what exactly constitutes an issue and when do issues matter? Robert Randle defines an issue as “a disputed point or question, the subject of a conflict or controversy” (1987, 1). Issues take a variety of forms. States can disagree over both tangible and intangible concerns (Rosenau 1971). Tangible issues might include control over a specific piece of land or the implementation of a certain trade policy among many others, while intangible issues deal with concepts like reputation, prestige, or ideology. Some issues can include both tangible and intangible elements. For example, the disposition of territory requires situating a tangible border, but it can involve intangibles such as national identity and self-determination. Moreover, issues vary in their saliency (Diehl 1992). Hensel et al. find that states most readily mobilize both armies and diplomats around highly salient issues (2008).

Many scholars argue that territory is one of the most salient issues facing states, if not the most salient, because it includes both tangible and intangible elements (Diehl 1999; Newman 1999; Goertz and Diehl 1992). Territory contains natural resources deemed valuable by states. These include oil, mineral wealth, water, fisheries and arable land. Alternatively, territory can have tangible security benefits that increase its conflict proneness. Controlling certain sea straights shape force projection patterns. Territory also possesses intangible qualities

that influence its saliency to states, including national identity, group autonomy, and influence in domestic politics (e.g. Hensel 2000; Huth 2000; Huth 1996; Goddard 2009). Monica Duffy Toft writes, “No matter how barren, no territory is worthless if it is a homeland” (2003, 1). This may explain why apparently valueless tracts of land have been central in a series of separatist conflicts. It may also explain why certain interstate disputes are particularly difficult to resolve, such as the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. While borders have tangible quantities, they may also aid the formation of imagined communities (Anderson 1991). Borders provide a heuristic for mentally demarcating the nation that can be difficult to set aside for both leaders and their civilian populations.

However, current approaches including saliency frequently treat saliency as an inherent issue attribute. This view suggests that actors will always care more about certain issues, and will collectively spend less time on those issues mutually understood to be less important. This line of reasoning ignores the fact that saliency is a perception. Actors internally prioritize issues when determining whether a question is particularly important to them. Because leaders respond to divergent institutions and may have dissimilar preferences, actors can examine the same issue and calculate saliency very differently. For example, the Chamizal boundary dispute between the U.S. and Mexico inflamed nationalist passion on the Mexican side of the border, but went barely noticed on the U.S. side. Likewise, most Americans are unaware that United States maintains a long running territorial dispute with Haiti over Navassa Island. However, the dispute is so salient to the Haitians that they wrote their claim into their constitution. An investigation examining how issues, actors’ preferences, and domestic incentive structures interact will both move the debate on regime bellicosity forward, and advance the field’s understanding of the mediating effects of institutions on issue politics.

Research exploring the link between regime type and territorial conflict has already adopted this approach implicitly; if issue saliency varies by governmental institution, then saliency cannot be determined without analyzing specific actors' incentives. However, contemporary published scholarship focuses exclusively on democracies. James, Park and Choi find that when democracies disagree over territory, they are much more willing to employ force than democratic peace theorists suggest (2006; Mitchell and Prins 1999). Democratic territoriality may only occur in dyads already engrossed in long term rivalries (Lektzian et al 2010). Scholars note that democracies are substantially less likely to have border disputes with their neighbors. Gibler theorizes that democracies flourish in regions with stable borders and suggests that resolving boundary disputes is a necessary precondition for the development of this form of regime (2007). Gartzke argues that most models of the democratic peace ignore the fact that regimes may have differential willingness to fight due to their convergence of policy preferences (1999; Miller and Gibler 2011). The fact that democracies have few outstanding territorial questions may explain why mutual democracy predicts peace.

While the field has begun examining the link between democracy and the relative saliency of territory, no current published research systematically addresses autocratic management of territorial disputes. Case study analysis of territorial disputes does obliquely suggest that regimes may vary in the treatment of boundary disputes (Fravel 2008). China, a single party state, appears remarkably conciliatory in its management of border disagreements. China has embraced negotiations and frequently accepted concessions in its talks with other states over land. However, current work on autocracy and territory is not broad enough to make generalizable claims about autocratic management of territorial disputes. In addition to advancing the debate on regime type and conflict propensity, and advocating for actor specific



interpretations of saliency, this paper fills a key gap in contemporary literature; it focuses on differences in autocratic sensitivity to territorial claims.

The previous section details the current debate on autocratic bellicosity. It suggests advancing this literature by adopting an issue area approach to conflict analysis and outlines the tenants of the issue paradigm. It also argues for increased nuance in the current issues approach, by evaluating how different actors' institutions and preferences affect their calculations of issue saliency. The next section adopts this strategy, and examines how autocratic regimes manage territorial conflict. It demonstrates that territorial conflict increases the domestic political control of some autocrats, while endangering the regime survival of others.

## **Theory**

Below I examine the relative incentive to militarize territorial disputes for different autocracies. This analysis reveals that military regimes, not personalists, manage their territorial disputes the most belligerently. Border fights uniquely strengthen the military as an institution. Moreover, sovereignty and border security fuel martial culture, and shape the identity of the military as a social institution. Militaries also prefer conflicts with clear cut objectives—which territorial warfare provides. On the other hand, while personalists may be more bellicose within other issue domains, these governments have motives to resist the escalation of border disputes.

### ***The Politics of Military Regimes***

Research assessing the internal logics of authoritarian governments demonstrates that different autocratic structures create substantial variation in international conflict escalation. I argue that this regime-based variation extends even to the most violent form of conflict: the

territorial dispute. First, I describe the structure of military dictatorships. I then theorize why military regimes fight over borders more than other regimes.

Most categorizations of autocracies rely upon two dimensions (Slater 2003; Weeks 2012; Magaloni 2006; Svobik 2009; Cheibub et al. 2010). The first dimension examines from which institutions within society a leader originates. Is a leader a civilian? Do they have a military or monarchic background? The second dimension documents the constraints a leader faces in exercising and maintaining their power. Military dictatorships have a group of officers decide who will lead the state, selecting from within their cadre (Geddes 2003).

However, a paramount leader who holds martial rank is not sufficient to classify an autocracy as a military regime. Many personalist dictators have or coopt military credentials. For example, both Saddam Hussein and Robert Mugabe have sported uniforms, despite lacking a history of military service. Other personalists, including Idi Amin and Muammar Gaddafi, have risen to power through a military coup. The second dimension of autocratic type helps properly classify dictators. Examining the constraints these leaders face, and which institutions within society limit leaders' decision making, can better clarify regime type.

Military regimes face additional constraints absent in personalist dictatorships. Personalist regimes are characterized by a lack of institutions strong enough to challenge a leader's decision making. These leaders have few, if any, veto players for whom they must tailor their policies. Moreover, personalists work tirelessly to maintain their unfettered control over the state. Personalists prevent normalized power transitions. They regularly rewrite constitutions or declare martial law to avoid impending term limits. Ferdinand Marcos used both strategies when facing legal limits to his control over the Philippines.

On the other hand, while military autocracies have uniformed chiefs, they also possess strong militaries. In contrast to personalist regimes, the armed forces of military governments have enough power and independence to depose the current face of the state. Between 1967 and 1968, Sierra Leonean army officers overthrew the head of state or ruling junta three times. In some instances, juntas even institutionalize the transition of power among leading generals. During Argentina's seven-year military dictatorship, the presidency shifted between six officers.

Moreover, coup-plotters frequently believe that a coup will enhance the power and prestige of the services. Absent this belief, military regimes do not come to power. A failed putsch entails not only risks to the individual officers but to the whole military (Powell 2012). Haiti disbanded its military after a series of coup attempts. Other armed forces have undergone purging after an unsuccessful attempt to grab power. Syrian Ba'athists redoubled their efforts to expel Nasserist forces from the military after Colonel Jassem Alwan led an aborted coup. Additionally, coups represent a significant coordination challenge for militaries undertaking them (Welch 1976; Belkin and Schofer 2003). Military elites' fear the dismemberment of the armed forces most of all (Geddes 1999). Inter-unit fighting destroys the corporate culture from which the military derives its efficacy. Coup plotters must believe that overthrowing the government will succeed and benefit them (Thyne 2010). Because the necessary conspirators to launch a successful coup frequently come from diverse backgrounds, strengthening the military represents the easiest method of rewarding participants. By contrast, personalist dictators consolidate their control over power by weakening every institution within society that might challenge them, often specifically targeting the military in coup-proofing attempts.

## ***Territory and the Military***

Because military regimes institutionalize the transition of power between military insiders and have relatively politically assertive armed forces, they face unique incentives prompting the escalation of territorial disputes. Within military dictatorships, military elites constitute the primary veto players. Therefore, state policy reflects the preferences of military leaders. Military leaders view territory as an especially salient issue for three reasons. First, military culture prizes the defense of territory as the *raison d'être* for the services. Second, territorial conflict provides a strong justification for expanding and strengthening the armed forces. Bureaucratic models of politics suggest that this should make military regimes especially territorial, since territorial conflict increases their strength relative to other institutions within society. Finally, terrestrial warfare tends to present more concrete military objectives than most other forms of conflict, and military leaders prefer it therefore. This section analyzes how such mechanisms result in military regimes pursuing territorial disputes at a higher rate of escalation, relative to other regime types.

Military culture influences officers' perceptions. Elizabeth Kier describes the effect of military training on soldiers' worldviews:

Few organizations devote as many resources to the assimilation of their members. The emphasis on ceremony and tradition, and the development of a common language and *esprit de corps*, testify to the strength of the military's organization culture. The culture of an organization shapes its members' perceptions and affects what they notice and how they interpret it: it screens out some parts of reality while magnifying others. (1995, 69).

By providing a mental heuristic for what is important to officers, military culture defines their preferences. The strength of this acculturation further implies that officers will have relatively

predictable preferences. Military regimes will therefore behave in consistent patterns when addressing issues commonly emphasized within military culture.

Military training teaches soldiers to believe that the control and maintenance of borders are intensely important. Socialization of the armed forces emphasizes the military as defender of national sovereignty (Geddes 2003, 54). Samuel Finer describes this belief system:

‘For the soldier...there exists neither the hamlet, nor the region, nor the province, nor the colony: there is for him nothing but the national territory. He has no family no relatives, no friends, no neighbours: only the people who live and work in the national territory...To it he must surrender all; safety, peace, family and life itself.’ Sentiments such as these would be re-echoed today in Cairo, Bagdad, Khartum; in Madrid or in Karachi; and wherever they are harboured they help lift the military to power (2009 [2002], 12).

Soldiers view the world in explicitly territorial terms. They are not officers of the peace who use force to keep law and order. They are defenders of their particular country as defined by its borders. Military leaders will therefore possess relatively strong preferences about the shape of their country. Because territory is an especially salient issue to these elites, conflicts escalate more when a military regime disputes over land.

The territorial ideology of military leaders is a crucial source of their legitimacy. The military is the primary institution within society charged with securing borders. The defense of territory is the functional reason militaries exist; without this justification, the state has few reasons to bear the expense of keeping a standing army. Because of their perceived organizational mission, military leaders will respond to territorial conflict more decisively.

Although threats to a country’s territorial integrity can affect all elements of society, territorial disputes uniquely undermine a military regime’s identity as guardian of the state. When explaining his decision to invade the Falklands/Malvinas, General Leopoldo Galtieri said, “We have regained the southern islands that legitimately form part of our national

patrimony-safeguarding the national honor-without rancor, but with the firmness demanded by the circumstances” (quoted in *New York Times* 1982). Galtieri’s focus on the connection between territorial disputes and national honor reflects how territorial ideology influences the perceptions of military elites. Ayub Khan, Pakistan’s first military leader, also framed the Kashmir dispute in terms of honor: “We want to establish normal relations with India as we have done with all our other neighbors. But this can be done only on the basis of honor and equality...Let us face realities and come to an honorable settlement of the Kashmir dispute without which there can be no peace” (quoted in *New York Times* 1965). Leaders from the armed forces are more likely to militarize these disputes to retain their legitimacy as defenders of the nation.


Military regimes also militarize territorial disputes more than other regimes because territorial conflict justifies expanding and strengthening the armed forces. Bureaucratic theories of politics suggest that institutions within society vie for resources amongst each other (Allison 1971; Welch 1992; Hermann, et al. 2001). State budgets are finite. Resources expended on the military could easily benefit other institutions such as the educational system, the justice system, or the intelligence community. When military regimes come to power, they disproportionately funnel resources to the institution from which they derive their authority. Upon coming to power, General Sani Abacha ordered the Nigerian army to occupy Bakassi, a potentially oil rich region claimed by both Nigeria and Cameroon. Throughout his tenure in office, the Nigerian armed forces added 50 percent more personnel. Abacha also expanded Nigeria’s military expenditures nine-fold while managing the Bakassi dispute. Military culture instills within these leaders a desire for a robust security force. More importantly, since juntas

rely upon their fellow officers to maintain power, military regimes tend to be especially deferential to the armed forces.

However, expanding the military is costly for society at large. To justify trading butter for guns, military regimes initiate or militarize territorial disputes. Territorial conflicts are especially resource intense. Only boots on the ground can expand a state's borders or prevent its forceful contraction. Without sufficient numbers of well-trained soldiers, it is impossible to hold territory. Winning these disputes therefore requires a robust military.

Figure 1 presents a bar graph comparing the mean size of state militaries per 100,000 population involved in a territorial dispute with those states not party to a territorial claim. It demonstrates that states with territorial claims have significantly larger armed forces relative to the size of their populations. While military regimes might remain relatively pacific within other issue domains, territorial conflict provides a compelling justification for military expansion.

Figure 1




Territorial conflict allows military regimes to channel additional resources to their primary constituency: their fellow soldiers. To win a territorial dispute, an army needs more than just personnel. Successfully militarizing a territorial claim requires a well-equipped and trained military force. Soldiers need to know effective combat tactics for terrestrial warfare. They must be sufficiently professional to allow coordination between units. Moreover, they must possess critical equipment for defending or annexing territory. For example, mechanized units are expensive, but still necessary for most terrestrial invasions. The 1965 Indo-Pakistani War over Kashmir saw some of the largest tank battles since World War II.

Defenders must also spend substantial funds on fortifications (Carter 2010) and equipment, such as anti-tank and anti-aircraft weaponry. Figure 2 presents a bar graph comparing the mean military expenditures of countries involved in territorial disputes to those not engaged in a territorial claim. On average, states involved in a territorial dispute spend an



additional 2.53 billion dollars on their militaries. By militarizing an extant dispute, the leaders of military regimes maintain a strong justification for strengthening the armed forces as a bureaucratic institution.

Figure 2



While territorial claims fortify the corporate interests of the military and thereby reward military regime insiders, leading generals have additional motivations for militarizing border disputes. The expansion of the military inherent to a territorial dispute augments leading generals' control over power. Prospective challengers to military regimes must weigh their ability to gain and maintain power. Expanded militaries in juntas mean that even if an opposition successfully ousts the regime, this opposition is unlikely to remain in office since the military will possess a force capable of launching another coup (Leon 2014). In fact, states

which experience a single coup frequently experience additional attempts (Powell and Thyne 2011). As an extreme example of this phenomenon at play, Bolivia has undergone 193 coups since independence in 1825. Its military has returned to power several times.

Moreover, expanding the armed forces through militarizing a territorial claim creates a larger constituency reliant upon the regime. By encouraging the spread of military culture through wider portions of a state's population, military regimes insulate their control over power. In addition to cultivating a stronger base of natural regime allies, spreading their ideology diffuses military elites' preferences through society. Other scholars have noted that military regimes frequently plan short stints in office, but use their time at the top to align other political actors' preferences with their own (Cook 2007). These leaders strategically entrench their preferences in institutions throughout a society if they believe they cannot hold on to power (Boylan 2001). Such tactics force successors to continue the previous government's preferred policies. Escalating territorial conflict provides an additional method military regimes use to emboss the armed forces' worldview upon a state's future political process.

Finally, military leaders prefer to fight conflicts with clear and measurable objectives. Furthermore, they prefer to use force when force is an appropriate tool to achieve a mission goal. Colin Powell outlines this world view common to generals:

When the political objective is important, clearly defined and understood, when the risks are acceptable, and when the use of force can be effectively combined with diplomatic and economic policies, then clear and unambiguous objectives must be given to the armed forces. We must not, for example send military forces into a crisis with an unclear mission they cannot accomplish... (1992)

Generals frequently wish to avoid conflicts with moving mission goals, and conflicts unlikely to be solved by sending more soldiers. With its clear goals and soldier-based strength,

terrestrial warfare presents the preferred form of conflict for most military elites. Land is delimited, and therefore these missions experience fewer changing objectives.

Other forms of conflict do not instigate well-defined goals. For example, economic disagreements may not require the military to act at all, and using force may even prove counterproductive. Intervention with the intent to change another state's regime frequently produces prolonged conflicts with no easy exit strategies. Although toppling another state's government can be achieved militarily, establishing a new government often proves difficult for generals. Together, the relative simplicity of territorial conflict and the institutional incentives inherent in military regimes explain leaders' behavior. Juntas do not simply militarize all disputes, but rather focus on the fights they believe they have the tools and strategy to win. Leading generals therefore militarize those conflicts which justify expanding the armed forces, but they avoid squandering military assets and personnel.

One potential challenge to this theory is that military service engenders caution and an unwillingness to escalate a dispute if it can be avoided. Theorists of military conservatism argue that military training and battlefield experiences prompt officers to develop a risk-averse outlook towards the use of force (Huntington 1957). Military officers may also be more realistic about what force can and cannot achieve, and thus avoid fights that an inexperienced civilian might pursue (Janowitz 1960). However, experimental psychological research suggests that actual exposure to battle is an important mediator in whether military elites adopt a risk acceptant or risk averse attitude (Voors et al 2010, Brunk, Secrest and Tamashiro 1990, Grossman, Manekin, and Miodownik 2015, Wallace 2014). This strand of research deeply questions the notion that all military service produces a conservative attitude towards the use of force. Horowitz and Stam find that leaders with a military background and no combat

experience as well as military leaders with a rebel combat background are especially likely to escalate disputes (2014). Because most juntas rise to power through some form of coup or rebellion, these military leaders are likely to be more militarily activist than the average officer (Weeks 2012). It follows that juntas will evince higher degrees of military activism towards territorial disputes.

This section has outlined three mechanisms explaining why military regimes are especially bellicose when involved in a territorial claim: military culture, bureaucratic incentives, and a martial preference for clear battlefield objectives. It argues that military culture is suffused with a territorial ideology that influences the preferences of military officers. When these officers come to power, they will thus view border disputes as particularly salient issues. Moreover, this territorial ideology underpins the armed forces as a legitimate institution within society. Challenges to a state's borders not only imperil the country, they test the very legitimacy of the military. Junta leaders will therefore disproportionately militarize territorial disputes to maintain their identity as defenders of the national honor. These conflicts also have clear military objectives which generals are trained to deliver. Non-territorial warfare by contrast frequently involves missions ill-suited to the use of armies, navies, and air forces. Finally, territorial disputes are resource intense conflicts. By militarizing a territorial claim, presiding generals have a compelling justification for expanding and strengthening their forces. Since soldiers are the primary constituency affecting the leaders of juntas, generals have a strong motive for increasing the armed forces. Providing additional resources to the military not only allow military regime leaders to transfer rents to their key supporters. Expanding the military deters potential opposition from challenging the regime.

### *Personalist Dictatorships and Territory*

While personalists are one of the most belligerent forms of autocratic governance across a diverse set of issue areas, these regimes have compelling reasons not to escalate territorial conflicts. This section introduces the politics of personalist dictatorships. Territorial conflict undermines common strategies personalists employ to maintain their hold over society. I therefore argue that personalists will be less bellicose than commonly expected when faced with a border dispute.

Military regimes answer the questions of who leads and who constrains leaders by elevating military elites to paramount positions, but still necessitating reliance upon a number of officers to maintain power. Unlike military regimes, personalists lack any strong institutional-based constraint to their rule. This form of autocrat enjoys unparalleled and unfettered discretion over state policy. Other regimes contain independent and strong institutions such as courts, a democratic public, or organized and influential parties. These veto players can impact or change state policy. Personalist regimes do not possess veto players who challenge their decisions or place in office.

Because of this lack of institutionally induced constraints, the literature expects personalist regimes to be especially aggressive. War is commonly believed to benefit only narrow segments of a state's population. Therefore, societies with wider audiences are expected to be more pacific (Fearon 1994, Snyder 1993, Prins 2003, Lipson 2003, Ireland and Gartner 2001, Koch and Gartner 2005, Koch 2009). Since personalists lack powerful groups within society to whom they must accommodate their policies, these leaders are more able to take the war path. Moreover, the literature suggests personalists must engage in especially violent and risk acceptant behavior to come to power (Horowitz, McDermott and Stam 2005). Not only

must they topple the current power structure of their state when they take office, they must also prevent challenges to their rule by employing various forms of repression. Because personalist leaders use violence domestically to achieve their aims, the field expects they will internationalize this behavior.

However, the field's portrait of personalist dictators as universally militarily assertive rulers ignores the nuances of how these leaders maintain their power. While personalist heads of state face few institutional constraints to their decision making, these dictators adopt strategies to ensure their regime's survival. A personalist must therefore forestall the ways in which leaders of their ilk generally lose office. Svoboda finds that dictators lose power most commonly through coups (2009). It follows that these autocrats devote substantial resources to preventing regime insiders or the military from replacing them.

Because coups require military support, dictators strategically undermine the military. Personalists systematically undercut the military by engaging in coup-proofing tactics (Quinlivan 1999). Such tactics include replacing merit-based promotion with political or co-ethnics-based promotions, supporting the overspecialization of military forces, and undermining the military's fighting efficacy (Pilster and Bohmelt 2011). Because of the ever-looming specter of a coup, personalist dictators strategically evade conflicts which might strengthen the armed forces (Leon 2014). These leaders therefore have strong regime survival motivations to avoid escalating territorial disputes.

Winning a territorial dispute requires an effective fighting force. Moreover, these conflicts are resource intense. Holding territory demands large infantries. It requires coordination to prevent flanking at newly established borders. However, a large professional military can topple a regime (Feaver 1999). Personalists will systematically avoid escalating

territorial disputes to avoid strengthening the military and the hands of would-be coup plotters. For example, territorial neutral zones and no-man's lands—bordering areas in which two countries mutually avoid delineating a border—are very rare. Only 8 such areas have existed since 1900, including Antarctica. Personalist dictators were party to 5 of these disputes. Despite decades of tense relations and an international reputation for extreme bellicosity, Saddam Hussein tolerated the existence of a neutral zone with Saudi Arabia and peacefully negotiated over its management. Similarly, Francisco Franco avoided militarizing Spain's dispute with the United Kingdom over Gibraltar even when Hitler offered his government military aid to take the peninsula. Instead, the Franco regime eventually established a neutral area between the two territories. Avoiding or peacefully negotiating territorial conflict is consistent with these regimes' established pattern of enfeebling the armed forces through coup-proofing.

As rational international leaders, personalists are concerned with more than simply maintaining their power. They also wish to maximize battlefield successes. The observed regularity that personalists are especially belligerent exists because in other issue domains these dictators do not face as acute a tradeoff between maintaining regime survival and ensuring military victory. For example, developing a nuclear arsenal allows personalists to strengthen their state vis-à-vis others, but doesn't provide personnel or training capable of emboldening military challengers to the regime. Unique among weapons, nuclear arsenals frequently feature civilian rather than purely military control. Personalists can engage in revolutionary conflict without threatening their tenure in office because these more populist conflicts do not tend to rely upon a professional fighting force. Likewise, economic and regime-based grievances can be successfully fought with fewer boots on the ground. Since dictators do not face the dilemma

between winning on the battlefield and maintaining power within other issue areas, territory is probably one of the few issues areas where personalists are less belligerent.

## **Research Methods and Findings**

Returning to the question, “who makes bad neighbors?” I examine dispute observations between 1945 and 2007. I draw observations from the Dyadic Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset (DYADMID). As I am interested in conflict onset, I employ a directed-dyad year unit of analysis. Directed-dyads are appropriate for testing theories about the identity of the conflict initiating state (Bennett and Stam, 2000). To test my hypothesis that military regimes are more territorial and thus more conflict prone than other types of regimes, I estimate a series of statistical models.

### *Dependent Variable: Initiation of a Militarized Dispute*

My outcome of interest is a state’s conflict proneness. I employ measures of dispute initiation drawn from DYADMID. MID initiation is coded when a state uses or explicitly threatens force against a target country. Theories of territorial preferences suggest that states are likely to disagree over the distribution of land because of territory’s high salience. Not only is territory important to states: territory can also influence elites’ willingness to consider force. Dispute initiation captures a state’s choice to militarize a disagreement it has with another country. Moreover, conflict onset is interesting in and of itself to scholars of International Relations. Our models attempt to explain and perhaps even predict why conflict emerges.

### *Measuring Regime Sensitivity to Territorial Issues*

For my analysis of comparative authoritarian form, I rely on Geddes’s coding of regime type (2003, Geddes et al. 2014). Scholarship on comparative authoritarianism frequently uses Geddes’s data (Peceny et al. 2002; Peceny and Beer 2003; Reiter and Stam 2003; Weeks 2008;



Weeks 2012; Way and Weeks 2014). Using her coding will therefore make my results more comparable with the majority of literature on authoritarian international relations. Geddes codes regimes as personalist, military, single party, or a hybrid, starting from the year 1945. Dummy variables indicate whether the regime was entirely personalist, single-party, or military, or possessed personalist, single-party, or military features. Other regime types are treated as the residual category.

Territorial claims proxy an international actor's sensitivity to territory (Senese and Vasquez 2003; Senese 2005; Rasler and Thompson 2006; Lee and Mitchell 2012). To capture the fact that territorial issues and not just shared borders shape conflict outcomes, I employ a measurement of territorial claims derived from Huth and Allee (2002). They code all territorial disputes (not to be confused with militarized disputes since these are a collection of state claims against the territory of another state) from 1919 to 1995. I updated the data on the presence of territorial disputes within a dyad between 1996 and 2007. I derived this extended universe of territorial claims from thousands of articles available through Lexis-Nexis, the International Boundary Research Unit's aggregation of news on territorial disputes, and Wiegand (2011).


I theorize that a state's regime type affects its sensitivity to territorial claims and by extension its conflict-proneness. A regime's domestic institutions mediate the effects of a territorial threat, and shape their acquisitiveness for land. I argue that military regimes have an incentive structure which encourages them to militarize territorial demands while personalists have fewer reasons to employ force. Therefore, I developed a series of measures to account for the differing saliency of territory to different regimes. I interacted Geddes typological dummies with the presence of a territorial dispute. This created a set of two specific territorial dispute moderator variables which I employ as my key independent variables.

## *Results*

My results present strong evidence that military regimes are more likely than other governments to militarize disputes involving a territorial claim. To contextualize my findings on conflict propensity, I first analyze the relative rates of territorial disputes and autocratic regime types. My unit of analysis is the directed dyad-year. Territorial disputes are very rare. They occur in less than 1% of directed-dyad years (0.5%). However, territorial disputes frequently arise concurrently with militarization. In 32.3% of militarized disputes, the dyad has an ongoing boundary disagreement.

Likewise, military regimes are an uncommon form of governance. Only 6% of all directed-dyad years between 1945 and 2007 feature states ruled by officers of the armed forces. By comparison, single party regimes oversee 23% of directed dyad-years, and personalists account for 12% of the data. This reflects the fact that military regimes generally maintain power for shorter durations than other regimes, while institutionalizing their preferences within society for after they transition out of power (Cook 2007). Juntas may only occasionally come to power, but they disproportionately fight over borders. Figure 3 highlights the mean militarization level of dyads involved in a territorial dispute, comparing the rate of militarization achieved by military regimes to non-military, non-personalist states. While conflict is a relatively rare event, the figure highlights the stark differences between military and non-military regimes. Military regimes engage in aggressive behavior in territorial disputes 136% more readily than other types of states.

Figure 3



Although personalists make up more of the data, they do not account for significantly more militarized territorial disputes. Figure 3 also plots the mean militarization level of dyads with an ongoing territorial disagreement and contrasts personalists' level of militarization to that of other non-military and single party regime types. The bar chart demonstrates that personalists do not fight over territory more readily than other regimes. Moreover, personalists account for less militarization than their military counterparts.

However, confounders may complicate these relationships. Since regime type is unlikely to be randomly distributed, naïve comparisons of means are insufficient to analyze the causal relationship in question. Military regimes may form in countries with higher military capabilities, which may also be associated with a greater propensity to militarize disagreements. Military governance might also co-vary geographically. Geographic factors are

widely acknowledged to affect conflict initiation. Since these and other confounding variables could obscure the relationship between different regimes' territorial sensitivity and conflict proneness, I estimate logistic regression models with theoretically relevant control variables.

Though Political Science as a discipline has long acknowledged the importance of controlling for omitted variables, appropriate controls remain contested. One approach to quantitative research builds models with a wide range of variables which are then compared as correlates rather than as individual causes of a dependent variable of interest. The downside to a “causes of effects” approach, however, is that models using this approach can include theoretically unmotivated variables, or worse—theoretically illegitimate variables—biasing results and clouding interpretation of the data (Ray 2003; Achen 2005; Clarke 2009).

Alternatively, scholars adopting an “effects of causes” approach must focus exclusively on conditioning variables which will result in valid inferences (Morgan and Winship 2007). Appropriate controls are variables which affect both key independents and dependent variables. However, variables which are a consequence of key independent variables are inappropriate controls due to their ability to induce post-treatment bias (Gelman and Hill 2006; Angrist and Pischke 2008). For my purposes, legitimate control variables cause military or personalist regimes to form, encourage these governments to behave territorially, and promote the militarization of a dispute. Variables which are a consequence of regime type or regime sensitivity to territorial disputes should not be included within regressions because they can mask or distort the causal effect of interest. Moreover, the magnitude and direction of this type of bias is not *a priori* knowable. Unfortunately, many of the variables commonly employed within analyses of territorial and militarized disputes are impacted by regime type. Examples of “post-treatment” variables found within the territory and conflict literatures include economic

openness (Lee and Mitchell 2012; Meseguer and Escriba-Folch 2011; Hankla and Kuthy 2013; Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2000) and prior conflict history. My models therefore only control for variables which are not caused by regime type.

Since MID data are a pooled cross-section, they violate the temporal independence assumption of logit analysis (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998). To address this, I use time-based indicators. First, I include a count of peace years. Peace years tally the time period in which a dyad goes without a MID. If a MID occurs, the counter is reset to 0 and continues counting up until another MID occurs. Following Carter and Signorino's advice, I also model higher orders of time by including the square and cube of peace years (2010).

I begin my analysis with a basic model that includes a set of regime-territorial dispute interaction terms, their constituent regime type and territorial dispute dummies, a control for contiguity, a control for time between claims, and the cubic polynomial variables addressing temporal dependence issues. The contiguity control, drawn from COW data, captures the opportunity to fight. Opportunity to fight could be an alternative pathway to territorial saliency through which conflict over land emerges (Bueno de Mesquita 1981). Since states are highly conscribed in their ability to dictate the identity of their neighbors, contiguity is handled as a pre-treatment confounder. This variable accounts for both land and maritime proximity, and ranges from 1 to 6 with lower numbers indicating greater contiguity. The claims year control accounts for the fact that border insecurity can shape a society's domestic political structure (Gibler 2007) and a state's conflict proneness. I developed a count of years in which a dyad goes without a territorial claim. If a border dispute occurs, my counter resets to 0.

Table 1 reports the results from this model. It demonstrates that military regimes engaged in a territorial dispute are significantly more conflict prone than democracies and non-

military/non-personalist autocracies. As expected, contiguity is significantly related to the militarization of a dispute. Since lower values of this variable account for more contiguousness, the direction of this relationship is as expected. The claims year count variable is also highly significant. Interestingly, the direction of the effect suggests that border stability tends to decay over time. However, the magnitude of this border decay is muted. This contrasts with peace year counts which generally observe that peace crystallizes the longer it endures. My time polynomials are highly significant and perform consistently with previous work.

<b>Table 1: Autocratic Territoriality and the Initiation of a Militarized Dispute</b>				
<i>Predictor</i>	<i>Basic Model</i>	<i>Plus Power Status</i>	<i>Plus Capabilities</i>	<i>Plus Foreign Policy Similarity</i>
Military Regime	.606 <sup>.001</sup>	.561 <sup>.002</sup>	.637 <sup>.001</sup>	.675 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>
Territoriality	(.184)	(.183)	(.183)	(.185)
Personalist Regime	-.129 <sup>.434</sup>	.000 <sup>.999</sup>	.047 <sup>.778</sup>	.029 <sup>.864</sup>
Territoriality	(.165)	(.165)	(.166)	(.167)
Single Party Territoriality	-.261 <sup>.452</sup>	-.415 <sup>.001</sup>	-.409 <sup>.002</sup>	-.407 <sup>.002</sup>
	(.127)	(.128)	(.129)	(.130)
Military Regime	.307 <sup>.040</sup>	.503 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	.485 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	.488 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>
	(.114)	(.114)	(.113)	(.114)
Personalist Regime	.725 <sup>.007</sup>	.729 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	.663 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	.657 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>
	(.084)	(.085)	(.085)	(.088)
Single Party Regime	.679 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	.576 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	.534 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	.502 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>
	(.067)	(.068)	(.068)	(.073)
Territorial Dispute	2.28 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	2.09 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	1.96 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	1.99 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>
	(.102)	(.101)	(.102)	(.103)
Contiguity	-.64 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	-.654 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	-.634 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	-.627 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>
	(.013)	(.012)	(.012)	(.013)
Claims Year	.021 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	.017 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	.015 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	.016 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.000)
Minor x Minor Power Dyad		-1.11 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	-1.35 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	-1.33 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>
		(.059)	(.066)	(.067)
Ln(High/Low Capabilities Ratio)			-1.155 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	-1.147 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>
			(.017)	(.018)
A's Similarity to System Leader				-.161 <sup>.238</sup>

				(.137)
B's Similarity to System Leader				-.327 <sup>.012</sup>
				(.13)
Years without a MID (t)	-.153 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	-.153 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	-.153 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	-.151 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>
	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)
t <sup>2</sup>	.002 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	.002 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	.002 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	.002 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
t <sup>3</sup>	-.000 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	-.000 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	-.000 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	-.000 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Constant	-2.91 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	-1.80 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	-1.26 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	-1.16 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>
	(.084)	(.1)	(.115)	(.124)
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.3458	0.3569	.3599	.3593
Log likelihood	-9190.66	-9034.37	-8989.45	-8820.20
N	1118314	1118314	1116420	1080610
<i>Notes: Two-tailed p-values in italicized super-scripts, standard errors in parentheses.</i>				

In the next columns, I report three modifications to this basic model. First, I include a dyadic measure of power status as a non-post-treatment measure of power projection abilities. This variable highlights dyads containing only minor powers since these dyads should have substantially less ability to launch military force. Second, I account for relative national capabilities within the dyad. To do so I use a higher/lower ratio of each countries composite index of national capabilities. I employ the natural log of this variable. Both controls are drawn from the COW capabilities dataset

Finally, I include measures of each country's foreign policy and alliance similarity to the leading state within a system (*s\_ld\_1* and *s\_ld\_2*). States with greater ties to the system leader tend to be less revisionist and therefore should initiate fewer conflicts (Schultz 2001). I include a dyadic measure of this concept because strong ties with a superpower could deter other states from initiating a MID. Some scholars argue that regime type impacts alliance patterns, with democratic allied dyads being more likely in any given year (Kimball 2010; Siverson and Emmons 1991). If they are correct, *S*, which includes alliances within its measure

of foreign policy similarity, might be a post-treatment variable (Way and Weeks 2014). However, other scholars have found very little evidence connecting regime type and alliance formation (Lai and Ritter 2000; Simon and Gartzke 1996). How can shared regime type impact the odds of being in an alliance in a given year and yet not have a positive association with the formation of alliances? Gibler and Wolford's findings that states democratize during an alliance may help explain this pattern (2006). They write:

Instead of regime type determining the choice of allies, we argue that certain types of alliances preserve peace by reducing the territorial threat to member states, and as the presence of territorial threat can hamper transitions to democracy, these alliances may contribute to the democratization of their member states (130).

Their analysis suggests that alliance patterns affect both conflict onset and regime type. As such, it is a crucial pre-treatment conditioning variable within an "effects of causes" analysis of autocratic conflict emergence.

These additional control variables behave in line with previous studies and are usually highly significant. If a dyad consists of only minor powers, my results imply that the country pair has a diminished likelihood of engaging in a militarized dispute. Increased power disparity likewise suppresses the chances of a MID onset. While not significant, when a possible initiator has closer ties with the system leader, it is less likely to initiate a dispute. This accords with previous findings demonstrating that countries closely aligned with a superpower are less revisionist. The negative coefficient on targets' ties with the system leader is also consistent with the previously observed deterrent effect.

Regardless of specification, military regimes' heightened sensitivity to territorial conflicts increases the probability of a dispute onset. The effects of a military regime with an



existing territorial dispute are moreover statistically significant according to two-tailed tests across my various models.

Interpreting interaction within logistic regressions is not intuitive due to the inherent nonlinearity of these models. Compression naturally induces interaction between all variables in binary response models (Nagler 1991; Berry and Berry 1991). Therefore, researchers must have a sound theoretical argument for including explicit interaction terms above and beyond the effects of compression within a logistic model (Brambor, Clark and Golder 2005; Berry, DeMerit and Esarey 2010). I hypothesize that military regimes find territorial conflict especially attractive due to the institutional incentives and cultures of these governments. Moreover, I argue that personalist regimes should be less likely to court militarized conflict over a territorial dispute because these conflicts empower possible coup plotters. My theory of how domestic institutions mediate the perceptions of territorial threat and value of territorial conflict therefore provides a strong basis for the inclusion of an explicit interaction. However, compression also complicates substantive explanations of interaction terms. Jaccard advocates for employing odds ratios to simplify analysis of substantive effects (2001). Within my full model, military regimes are nearly twice as likely to initiate a conflict over a territorial question compared to other types of governments. By contrast, personalist dictators facing a territorial dispute are not statistically more likely than other regimes to threaten or use force. These results are robust to adding a variety of other variables, employing a rare events data correction, and altering the base regime category. I report these additional robustness checks in an appendix.

My theory predicts that military regimes facing a territorial dispute have a statistically positive relationship with conflict onset, but that personalist dictators will not demonstrate such

a relationship. However, I also argue that important differences between these regime types which produce this divergent behavior. To ascertain whether this is true, it is insufficient to merely demonstrate that the coefficient on the military regime-territorial dispute interaction term is significant while the personalism-territorial claim coefficient is insignificant. I therefore conduct a test of equality between coefficients. I find that military regime interaction is statistically distinct from personalist interaction at the .05 level (using a two-tailed test). This provides strong evidence that personalist are less territorial their junta counterparts.

## **Conclusion**

This article argues that debates about which regimes are the most belligerent or peaceful are pointless without considering how issue area interacts with a regime's domestic institutions. One type of regime may find territory especially salient and therefore conflict inducing. Another government with different internal structures may manage these disputes more peacefully. However, their conflict-proneness may switch when the same governments face foreign policy questions in different issue areas. My findings suggest that such a pattern exists within the domain of territorial dispute management. Military regimes have both institutional and cultural reasons for militarizing border conflicts. By contrast, personalists are less likely to initiate a conflict over a territorial dispute because they fear empowering military elites who may wish to remove them from office via a coup d'état.

This finding has two related theoretical implications. First, adopting a research agenda which examines the interaction between regime type and issue area may help resolve long standing puzzles in the comparative regimes conflict literature. A variety of studies find that personalists are especially violent international actors. However, other research instead observes that military regimes account for most disputes. Because both schools aggregate issue

area, these studies obscure the relationship between internal regime structures and leaders' calculations of salience. Rather than asking which regime is the most violent or peaceful, the field should attempt to answer the following question: which issue areas are particularly triggering to which regimes?

This study also has lessons for issue area scholars. In the past, researchers have attempted to categorize and rank issues by their degree of saliency. While regime scholars' debate over which government structures produce the most conflict, issue area researchers ask which issues are most volatile. Such an approach assumes that saliency does not vary across actors. It implies that states are territorial because land is always extremely important to everyone. However, my findings demonstrate that calculations of saliency are contingent upon institutions. By focusing on territorial dispute management, my results show that regimes can respond heterogeneously within the same issue domain. Rather than assuming that all international actors rank issue saliency in the same way, scholars should treat this as an empirical question.

To further both agendas, future research should examine how regime type interacts with additional issues. This paper has demonstrated that military regimes handle territorial conflict more violently than personalist regimes. But how will these regimes manage economic disputes, or international conflicts over their very regime structure? Could regime interact with other policy areas? Answering these questions will enrich our understanding of the ways in which domestic political institutions shape interstate outcomes, and grant International Relations a clearer picture of "second-image" politics. Moreover, further investigation will provide the field with a better understanding of who fights, when and why.

Substantively, this research raises interesting questions about the saliency of territory and conflict proneness of other types of authoritarians. As a robustness check, I examined a model treating democracies as the base category, rather than all non-personalist or non-junta regimes. The results demonstrate that single party regimes may find territory less salient than democracies. This conflicts with the field's belief that democracies are the most relatively pacific type of government. Future research should explore which issues are relatively triggering to democracies. However, the single party finding requires more research given China's dominant presence within the territory issue domain. It does raise interesting questions about the rise of China. If single-party regimes do not find territory to be an especially salient issue area, China's rise may be more peaceful than previous great power transitions.

In addition to its theoretical implications, the findings contain policy lessons. Previous scholarship has argued that diplomacy with military elites frequently breaks down because leaders are trained to see a world of threat. This world view exacerbates the security dilemma and produces devastating conflict spirals. My analysis suggests that juntas may find some types of disputes more threatening than others. Specifically, other states will find it especially difficult to negotiate border agreements with governing generals. Diplomats should expend extra effort assuaging the fears of military dictators when involved in a territorial dispute.

Moreover, juntas face fewer costs when engaging in territorial warfare because this form of conflict strengthens their core supporters. States with an active territorial claim against a military autocracy should invest in extra deterrent capacity in order to dissuade these leaders from escalating. By raising the costs of territorial warfare, targeted states may persuade juntas that attacking is not worth the effort. States targeted by military regimes with a territorial claim must also send unambiguous signals of resolve to prevent conflict from breaking out. Strategic

ambiguity courts miscalculation by governing generals already inclined to use force in managing border disagreements. For example, if the United Kingdom had sent unequivocal signals of their intent to keep the Falkland Islands, including fortifying them, this may have persuaded the Argentinian junta not to attack.

There are also lessons for managing disputes with personalists. Contrary to views that all states care deeply about territory, personalists have extra incentives to avoid fighting over land. This opens additional bargaining range that diplomats should employ to reduce border insecurity. Furthermore, scholarship suggests that resolving territorial disputes is frequently a first step towards democratization. Countries interested in spreading democracy should therefore emphasize negotiated border settlements with personalists, since they will be more willing to bargain than other forms of autocrats. This method of encouraging regime change relies upon slow, structural changes and should be less threatening to targeted governments than more overt or forceful techniques.

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## PAPER 2

### UNSTABLE GROUND: WHY DO STATES CLOSE BORDERS

#### **Introduction:**

The civil war in Syria has produced the largest refugee crisis to date. Between 2011 and 2016, 4.8 million people have attempted to flee the violence within Syria by seeking asylum or refugee status outside of the country. Syrians have hiked hundreds of miles, rafted in dangerous overflowing dinghies, navigated bureaucratic hurdles, and sought the aid of smugglers to escape Assad's unrelenting bombing campaigns, mass human rights violations, and sporadic use of illegal chemical weapons. The magnitude of the crisis has strained the international community's compassion. Many states along refugee corridors have argued that the mass influx of war-ravaged survivors stresses their resources and political stability. To stem the tide, some states have taken to shutting their doors on refugees. In a concerted effort to close off Europe to fleeing Syrians, the EU and several countries coordinated efforts to close what had become known as the Balkan route to the few countries within Europe offering safe haven en masse in 2016—namely Germany and Sweden. In January 2016, Austria took the dramatic step of suspending the Schengen agreement to increase border controls. In February, it introduced 12 new border checkpoints and substantially limited the number of asylum seekers it allowed to pass through them. Finally, at the end of March, it began rejecting almost all asylum seekers hoping to enter the country. States located between Austria and Greece along the Balkan route, fearing that they would be stuck with fleeing migrants due to this closure, followed suit and diplomatically sealed


their borders to refugees. This represents the first large scale international effort to use border management to mitigate the effects of a crisis.

Though the current Syrian refugee crisis is unparalleled in its magnitude and impact, states have used border controls to manage many smaller and less transnational crises. However, International Relations has paid little attention to how and why states employ border management techniques to achieve political goals. The paucity of research into this question is particularly surprising considering the emphasis states place on the good regulation of their borders. Historically, border controls allowed states to deter invasion, protect local industries through tariffs and import restrictions, and tax trade. Regardless of the claims that globalization has rendered borders irrelevant, states continue to expend significant effort attempting to control cross border flows. Rather than diminishing in importance, border control techniques continue to evolve to address new economic and security concerns. Borders are a principal tool states use to limit unwanted immigration, domestic political meddling by foreign actors, drug trafficking and other smuggling, refugee flows, and terrorist infiltration (Andreas 2003; Krasner 1999). Well-functioning border management thus has important implications for state security, wealth, and domestic stability. It is therefore imperative that the field ask the following questions: Why and when do states close their borders? Why do states chose border closures over other available management techniques? And how do states manage their borders during both long-term and short-term crises?

States have several potential strategies when dealing with a border crisis. They can maintain the status quo and ignore the crisis. They can militarize their border by adding more guards; Iran did this in the wake of the Iraq and Afghanistan invasions by the United States. (Gavrilis 2008; Andreas 2003, 2000). They can build fences to focus flows towards official

crossings (Carter and Poast 2017; Hassner and Wittenberg 2015). For example, Israel has several border fences that aim to steer traffic towards approved and controlled crossings. Or they can shut the border down. The Trump administration made closing the U.S. border to refugees of several countries a first week regime priority. Between 1980 and 2011, states closed their borders 546 times. Approximately half of these closures occurred between 2001 and 2011. Figure 1 highlights the over-time trends in number of border closures and demonstrates that border closures are gaining in popularity among states, rather than declining.

**Figure 1: Border Closure Initiation by Year, 1980-2011**



An emerging literature on border management techniques has begun to tackle questions of how states control flows across their frontiers. Early studies have produced promising explanations for the militarization of borders and the erection of border fences. However, border management scholars have yet to tackle the correlates of border closures, despite the rising popularity of this technique among states. I extend the border management research agenda by conducting the first study of border closure practices. I hypothesize that civil wars in bordering

countries encourage states to close their borders. This contradicts past research that has argued civil wars do not prompt states to change their border management practices (Poast and Carter 2017). I develop a theoretical framework which explains why states close borders during refugee crises but do not build fences. This framework further explains why states build fences but do not close borders during economic crises. I argue that states engage in a cost-benefit analysis when managing their borders which forces them to balance the duration and intensity of the crisis against the cost and inflexibility of a proposed management technique. This paper provides the first cross-national investigation into the causes of border closures. Moreover, while scholars have examined some border control strategies in isolation, this paper provides the first cross-national comparison of when states might employ different management practices. It further develops an integrated theory explaining how states select among the portfolio of their border management tactics that accounts for past findings within this research program, namely that economic disparity encourages states to build fences, as well as my new finding that they do not close borders due to economic inequality.

While my theoretical contribution expands the border control literature, my newly introduced data has additional applications outside of this research agenda. Border closures have been an important hallmark of several political rivalries. North Korea has kept its border closed with South Korea during most of the last six decades. North Korea maintained the closure even though it kept them internationally isolated, and that it prevented them from benefitting from East Asia's development miracle. Similarly, Turkey has sealed its border with Armenia since 1993, when Armenia invaded Azerbaijan. It has also been used intermittently in shorter term rivalries such as between Thailand and Cambodia, or between Kenya and Somalia during particularly chaotic periods in Somali politics. Therefore, data on border closures could provide

early warning data for the emergence of state conflict and rivalry. Moreover, while significant research underlines how territorial disputes can escalate into violence, very little work provides a foundation for how states select into these disputes (a notable exception is Huth 1996). Yet, states often close their borders during the lead up to a territorial dispute: as seen prior to the Kahemba dispute between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda, the Doi Lang dispute between Thailand and Myanmar, and Lebanon throwing its hat into the Shebaa Farm dispute between Israel and Syria. Border closure data may productively enrich models of territorial dispute escalation and management by helping correct for selection effects. Finally, studies of cross-border flows such as international trade, foreign investment, and migration research have yet to consider state's ability to close borders. This is a notable oversight that could produce substantially biased estimates. These data should help scholars correct for the effects of closed borders in future research into the international movement of goods, money, and people.

I develop my argument as follows. First, I briefly review the scholarship on border crises and management. Next, I provide a theoretical explanation for why civil wars should not be discounted as a source of border crises in the face of previous findings. This section also develops a theoretical explanation for why states choose different strategies when immersed in different types of crises. Third, I outline my method and research design for evaluating my hypotheses. In the fourth section, I test my hypotheses using a new dataset of state border closures between 1980 and 2011 and describe my empirical findings. I conclude by suggesting further directions the border management research agenda should take.

## **Literature Review**

International Relations scholars have long argued that states are especially prone to fight over territory, and that disputes over the location of borders are uniquely violent (Vasquez 1993;

Kocs 1995; Diehl 1999; Hensel 2000; Senese 2005; Huth and Allee 2002; James, Park and Choi 2006; Mitchell and Hensel 2007; Tir and Diehl 2002; Rasler and Thompson 2006; Simmons 2005). However, an effective border is more than an undisputed and fully demarcated line. Borders control the flows of people and goods between states. They are also loci of diplomatic contact between state representatives. Whole bureaucratic institutions spring up to manage customs outposts and guard crossings. An emerging literature analyzes how borders can become sites of contestation between states even when their governments fully agree on the status quo division of territory. This promising research agenda analyzes states' attempts to stabilize their borders in the face of challenge.

Research into the institutional failure of, and challenges to, borders has followed one of two paths: in depth case studies of border management and mismanagement, or large-N studies of a single border management strategy. States can employ multiple strategies to manage their borders, some of which are relatively effective, and other which are relatively counterproductive (Gavrilis 2008). Gavrilis analyzes cases where states have delegated significant decisions to their border agents and empowered them to work across the border with their peers, cases where states have centralized and disempowered their border stewards, and cases where states have militarized their borders. Gavrilis posits that borders become unstable when states overly centralize their management of customs agents and border guards. He theorizes that stable borders emerge when local officials on both sides of a border have enough autonomy to coordinate with their peers from the other country. Border agents must fight smuggling; prevent cross-border infiltration of rebels and criminals, and deter illegal immigration. It is a dynamic and fast-paced law enforcement job made extra challenging by having to interface with peers from another jurisdiction (Carter and Goemans 2011). Gavrilis provides rich historical analysis

of successful and unsuccessful border management along the Greek-Turkish border. However, his theory of the causes of border mismanagement receives no systematic analysis. Thus, it is difficult to know the representativeness of the Greek-Turkish cases. However, Gavrilis usefully demonstrates that states have multiple strategies they can employ when attempting to address crises along their borders.

While the case study work focuses on the fact that states must choose from multiple potential management strategies, quantitative work examines the correlates of a single management technique: border fence construction. Carter and Poast argue that states build border fences to staunch the flow of economic immigration (2017). They find that fences are rarely built as security fortifications. Nor are they designed to exclude refugees from neighboring countries embroiled in civil war. Carter and Poast thus argue that border fences are a manifestation of instability caused by citizens failing to respect a border and its accompanying immigration laws.

Likewise, Hassner and Wittenberg argue that security concerns do not motivate states to build fences (2015). Their quantitative analysis finds no relationship between the existence of many territorial disputes and the erection of a fence. They also argue that terrorism does not fuel their construction. Instead, they find that border fence builders and targets are disproportionately Muslim-majority states. Echoing Carter and Poast's economic findings, they observe that cross-border wealth differences and economic immigration patterns encourage the construction of fences.

However, border fences are only one method states have for stabilizing their borders, and it is a method that may be prohibitively expensive for many states to employ. Other strategies have received no systematic attention to date. I close this hole in the literature by introducing a

new dataset which records border closures between 1980 and 2011. This data will help resolve puzzles about why states employ border closures as a strategy, despite the cost and dislocation this tactic entails. While border fences are an important management technique, they are also a technique more likely to be employed by relatively high capability and wealthy states, due to their costs and technical challenges. Even in economically advanced countries near metropolises, building these fences is an expensive technical challenge. The United States spent between \$16 and \$21 million per mile to build a primary fence near San Diego. Even in locations with relatively low labor costs, like Northern Africa, maintaining fences is not cheap. Spain spent approximately \$6 million per mile renovating an aging boundary fence surrounding Melilla. These states' challenges may not fully represent the breadth of possible sources of border instability. Examining border closures allows a fuller understanding of how states, regardless of capacity, attempt to stabilize their borders. Studying how states chose between closing their borders and building walls is the first step towards understanding how states select management tactics from their portfolio of border control strategies. Furthering this goal, my study provides the first quantitative assessment of multiple border control strategies. Below, I theorize that states match their border management tactics to the duration, efficacy, and cost-benefit implications of the crisis they face.

### **Theory of Crisis Type and State Selection between Border Management Techniques**

Why do states close their borders? Border crises and instability can stem from many sources including but not limited to smuggling, criminal activity, security threats both from states and non-state actors, illegal immigration and refugee displacement. I argue that states close their borders when confronted with neighboring civil wars. Civil wars tend to be relatively short, but intense crises. Therefore, states do not tend to rely upon more permanent border management



techniques such as fortification and wall building. I develop this argument by explaining the differing nature of border challenges states confront. I outline the variety of strategies open to states to manage these challenges. Finally, I explain how different strategies are more or less effective and costly at addressing particular types of border instability. I argue that states match their chosen border management strategy to the duration, efficacy, and cost-benefit implications of the crisis they face.

### ***The Characteristics of Border Challenges: Duration and Intensity***

To develop my theory that states chose their border management technique to align with the attributes of a border challenge, I first outline two prominent characteristics of border challenges: duration and intensity. After defining the concept of challenge intensity, this section develops a typology of crises. I then place several common border problems within this typological space.

States face international crises of varying intensity and duration. This truism also applies to border crises. Some border crises will be short and intense. For example, refugee troupes numbering in the tens or hundreds of thousands have flowed across borders within a single day. 250,000 war-ravaged Burundians entered Tanzania seeking refugee through a single check point within a 24-hour period. Some border challenges will be long, but relatively moderate or even trivial. For example, cross border smuggling tends to be a hallmark of most borders, and is often not politicized into a full crisis provided border agents work effectively with their cross-frontier peers (Gavrillis 2008). Other border crises will be long and intense. Economic inequality tends to produce crises of long duration since structural economic differences are slow to equalize across borders. In fact, borders are a political institution in part designed to delay such equalization by opportunity hoarding within a single territorial jurisdiction.

Crisis intensity encompasses the concept that some challenges pose greater economic, military or political threat to a receiving state's government. A challenge is a high intensity crisis if the government could lose power due to its continuation. A low intensity challenge does not imperil a state's central authority. Challenges can fall anywhere between the extremes of no risk to the state's government or its agents to risking the future existence of the state as an autonomous political unit.

<b>Figure 2: Border Management Tactic by Cost and Flexibility</b>			
		<b>Flexibility</b>	
		<i>High</i>	<i>Low</i>
<b>Cost</b>	<i>High</i>	Border Closure	Border Fence
	<i>Low</i>	No Change in Border Management	Increase Number of Border Agents

Figure 2 situates several types of typical border challenges in a two-dimensional space formed by the two core axes of duration and intensity. Duration and intensity are both plotted on a spectrum from low to high. The list is by no means exhaustive. Moreover, specific border crises of a single type may vary somewhat within the proposed space. For example, the massive Syrian refugee crisis would fall farther in the upper left quadrant than the relatively slow trickle of refugees leaving the Northern Triangle region of Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala which would reside within the upper right quadrant. Instead, the figure points to general temporal and severity trends for particular forms of flow challenges. To build my theory that states match their border control tactics to the needs of a specific border challenge, I must next outline the characteristics of their management techniques.

### ***The Characteristics of Border Management Techniques: Cost and Flexibility***

Because challenges to a border can take several forms, states have developed several methods for combating them. States have a portfolio of foreign policy options available to them when managing a crisis or a disagreement (Keohane and Nye 1977; Gavrilis 2008; Weigandt 2011). This is no less true when states face a significant disruption to the smooth and effective functioning of their borders. The collection of border management strategies forms a portfolio of border management strategies. Strategies within this state border management portfolio entail different benefits, weaknesses and costs. I argue that states tailor their response to the severity and length of challenges. To illuminate this tailoring process, I must first outline the strategies available to states and then rank them on their costs and flexibility.

States possess four empirically observable border control strategies: three active and one passive. I discuss these strategies in order of least costly to most costly. First, states can choose to accept the status quo at the border, and not chart a major course correction in its management. This is the passive response to an extant border strain. Next, states can increase the number of guards and customs agents enforcing the border. This tactic adds more resources to support the state's current daily practices at the border, but does not usually entail a radical reorientation of the border agents day-to-day mission. Next, states can close their border posts and turn traffic away en masse at crossings. This strategy fundamentally alters the norms at a border since the vast majority of states use their borders to regulate traffic but not fully stop flows. This strategy is costlier than the previous one since states forgo the positive benefits of flows to stop a particular negative type of traffic. It also entails political costs since border closings dampen economic activity on either side of the border. Therefore, a state that unilaterally shuts down traffic with a neighbor, risks worsening diplomatic relations with that neighbor. Jordan regularly

closed its border to travelers attempting to enter its country from Israel during the 1970s. In 1981, Israel retaliated by closing down foreign entrance on its side of the border to keep Jordanians from asymmetrically reaping benefit from cheaper tourism to Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Galilee. This action and reaction further soured relations between the countries over management of the West Bank. Finally, states can build border fences that substantially limit traffic across the border as well as focalize it to approved crossings. Like closing the border, this tactic has high opportunity costs by unintendedly limiting positive forms of flow. But it also has high realized costs. Placing barriers along miles of territory, often located in remote and inhospitable places is no small task. Fences require state capacity and financing to build. These are pure strategies designed to highlight their ideal types, though some mixing also likely occurs.

Cost is only one metric along which these tactics diverge. They also vary in ease of switching to another available tactic. Border fences are the longest lasting and least flexible tactic. Though they will decay over time if not maintained, that is a slow process. For states to abandon fencing, they have to invest additional resources to remove it (though in the only two notable cases of border fence removal during the 20th century--the Berlin Wall and Panama Canal Fence--disgruntled citizens tore down these walls.) Adding additional border agents is also a medium to low flexibility tactic. While states can always fire guards and customs agents, in practice most bureaucracies do not contract once expanded (Niskanen 1975; Ehrenberg 1973; Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman 1981; Dunleavy 2014). Bureaucrats have significant incentives to defend their budgets and often benefit from asymmetric information when bargaining with political sponsors (Banks and Weingast 1992). These processes make drawing down border enforcement difficult once enacted. Border closures can vary from a day to years. However, almost all closures are of fairly short duration. Most are closed between a day and a few months.

Since most closures are treated as temporary measures to restrict a flow or pressure a neighbor into changing policy and the closing state always retains the ability to reopen their side's crossings, border closures are a highly flexible tactic. Finally, states can choose to do nothing, though they always have the option of adopting one of the other three tactics. Therefore, this strategy usually involves a wait-and-see approach to border management, rather than embarking on an immediate change in border management. This strategy is thus the most flexible posture from which states can reassess.




Figure 3 presents a 2x2 typology that characterizes strategies by their costliness and flexibility. Cost and flexibility are both broken into two categories: high and low. The strategy of maintaining the status quo is the least costly and most flexible. By contrast, building a fence is the costliest and least flexible strategy. Hiring border guards represents a relatively low cost, but inflexible strategy due to the inelasticity of bureaucratic expansion. Finally, border closings

represent a high cost and high flexibility tactic. The next subsection explains how the characteristics of border challenges and border strategies interact, and explains why state's carefully match their tactics to address the quality of challenge they face.

### ***Why States Match Strategies to the Intensity and Duration of a Challenge:***

This section outlines how state's match their strategies to the intensity and duration of a challenge. I argue that a mismatch between a selected tactic's costs and flexibility and a challenge's intensity and duration produce inefficiency and possibly policy failure. States have strong incentives to choose a border management strategy that sufficiently addresses a challenge, but that does not force the state to bear unnecessary costs or sacrifice more flexibility than required to stabilize the border.

I argue that the cost states are willing to bear to manage a challenge reflects its intensity. If states spend a lot to address a low intensity problem, this is wasteful. Likewise, if states chose a low-cost tool for a high intensity problem, it is likely the crisis will fail to abate. Similarly, states have strong incentives to maximize their policy flexibility. This is doubly true at borders since border politics and problems are often dynamic. States will thus choose more flexible policies when dealing with shorter duration problems and will accept inflexible tactics when approaching a long-term crisis. Adopting an inflexible solution to a short-term problem limits a state's future options and is an inefficient outcome. Likewise, long duration challenges often require long-term policies to limit their strain on the smooth functioning of a border. Thus, more flexible tactics are likely to be unsuccessful and wasteful. Figure 3 maps the optimal policy space for the four border strategies onto the stylized positioning of border challenges by intensity and duration.

Previous scholarship on border management has focused almost exclusively on explaining the phenomenon of border fencing. The principle finding that emerges from the border fences literature is that economics rather than security and the prevention of the diffusion of civil wars drives border management (Carter and Poast 2017; Hassner and Wittenberg 2015). Figure 3 argues that border fences emerge because economic crises are long ranging and intense. Moreover, figure 3 suggests that broadening our measures will help us better understand what drives shorter term, high intensity crisis responses.

I argue that civil wars are an intense, but relatively short duration border crisis. Therefore, a state must employ a costly strategy to stabilize its border, but they need not sacrifice much flexibility. During a civil war, combatants and refugees both have strong incentives to violate the integrity of the border. Combatants cross international borders to forestall their pursuit by state forces (Saleyhan 2008). In addition to providing a safe haven during retreat, combatants crossing borders can often regroup and resupply before returning to the fray. These cross-border forays can inadvertently draw neighboring states into the conflict or trigger their own civil wars. Likewise, refugees fleeing combat will want to use the sanctuary that borders can create to limit their exposure to harm's way. However, refugees often flow into countries more quickly than they are willing or able to welcome them. States have a strong incentive to close their borders to slow or prevent both flows. States will use the high cost and high flexibility strategy of closing their borders in cases of civil war on the belief that such conflicts are comparatively short lived and dynamic in nature. While civil wars are dramatic, high cost crises, they are relatively shorter lasting than major structural economic differences between countries.

***Hypothesis 1:*** *All else being equal, the presence of a civil war in a neighboring country increases the probability of a border closure.*

Next, border closures are not more likely in the presence of economic inequality. This stems from the fact that economic inequality is a high duration problem. Therefore, states must adopt long-term durable solutions to resolve its impact on the border. Fully closing a border in this scenario would damage both countries' economies substantially. Longer term border closures have been noted to cause famine and impoverishment along the border. Therefore, states will build fences instead. Fences limit illicit traffic by focalizing all flows to approved crossings. Flows continue to move across borders in the presence of border fences unlike with closures, explaining why states should prefer fences to closures when dealing with this form of crisis.

***Hypothesis 2:** All else equal, the presence of economic inequality along a border should be unrelated to the probability of a border closure.*

This section has outlined a theory of the structure of border challenges. It suggests that border challenges vary along two dimensions: duration and intensity. It has also observed that border management tactics vary along two dimensions: cost and flexibility. It argues that states will match the appropriate strategy to the type of conflict, or inefficient outcomes emerge. Following this logic, despite previous research which has found that civil wars do not destabilize borders, I hypothesize that civil wars will be positively associated with border closures. Furthermore, I hypothesize that economic inequality will have no relationship with border closures. The next section outlines the data and methods to test this conjecture, and introduces an exciting new dataset on border closures.

## **Research Design**

This section describes how I operationalized the concept of a border closure to produce an original dataset. It also highlights procedures for operationalizing variables derived from my hypotheses and alternative mechanisms. I include a full list of closure events in an appendix.



Moreover, it discusses how I address potential cofounders. Though states occasionally close their borders to non-contiguous states, as Pakistan closing its Iraq border to NATO members following a series of unauthorized drone strikes demonstrates, cases of this nature are a very rare exception rather than rule. Therefore, I focus on all contiguous state-to-state directed dyads as my unit of analysis.

### ***Measuring Border Closures***

I developed an original dataset of interstate border closures. I define a border as closed if a country's central authorities prohibit the flow of people across an international frontier. A border closure is a visible diplomatic act. In the regular course of their duties, border guards occasionally shut down posts to address dangerous situations such as bomb scares or extreme weather. However, closures of this nature would not be included within the definition since these decisions are routine enough that a country's political elite have delegated them down to low level functionaries. These shutdowns tend to be for a few hours and the main goal of guards is to safely re-establish the flow of traffic through a crossing. Moreover, since a state's political leadership is uninvolved in these types of quick shutdowns, these disturbances lack diplomatic import.

States sometimes shut their borders to certain products or industries as a form of economic protectionism or to prevent the spread of diseases that could ravage agriculture. For example, during a 2001 devastating outbreak of Foot-and-Mouth Disease in the United Kingdom, several neighboring European countries banned the import of livestock or agricultural products from affected areas. Similarly, to buffer the U.S. long haul trucking industry, the United States delayed opening its borders to Mexican trucking companies for over twenty years despite agreeing to when it signed the North American Free Trade Act in 1994. However, protectionism

is a distinctly different phenomenon than the wholesale restriction of travel across interstate frontiers. Moreover, border agents still allow the vast majority of traffic through a border when a class of products is banned. Therefore, these cases are not included within the definition.

States sometimes close internal borders. This is especially likely during separatist conflicts. For example, Israel regularly isolates the West Bank and Gaza Strip regions to economically blockade the Palestinian people as well as limit cases of sectarian violence. These cases would be excluded by the definition's focus on an interstate border since the West Bank and Gaza Strip are not internationally recognized states. However, Israel and Egypt have at times cooperated to close off these regions. Since both countries meet the commonly accepted definition of states employed within studies of international politics, Egypt closing its border with the Gaza strip would count as an event within the dataset.

Note, there is a distinction between tightening border controls and closing a border. Border controls are measures taken by a state to monitor and regulate cross-border flows. Tightening border control measures includes adding visa requirements to travelers from particular countries, increased searches of luggage and containers, as well as increasing tariffs. While these actions are designed to impact the flow of traffic across a frontier, they are not usually designed to prohibit it. Thus, cases where a state tightened but did not ban travel would not be incorporated within the analysis.

Using the above definition, I scoured a variety of sources to identify border closure events. Border closures are high profile diplomatic events that generally result from the souring of diplomatic relations between two countries. Thus, they are widely published by press outlets. Using *LexisNexis*, I coded every border closure reported by newspaper outlets between 1980 and 2011. To collect relevant articles, I used the search terms "border closure" and "border closed"

and coded over 8,000 articles. An event is included within the dataset if at least two sources mention the closure. For cases, where only one newspaper appeared to have reported on the shutdown, I consulted various encyclopedia entries (especially for older closures). I validated this list by examining inter-coder reliability and comparing it to closure data from Anderson's *International Boundaries: A Geopolitical Atlas* for available years (2003).

Since I argue that measures of border instability will differ depending on the challenges states face, I run parallel models for my dependent variable as well as Carter and Poast's border fence variable (2017). They track the presence of border fence within a dyad between 1800 and 2014. Carter and Poast consider a border fence to be any man-made construction that denies entry of unwanted persons or things.

I examine a pooled-cross section of directed dyads. Directed dyadic analysis allows me to untangle how characteristics of the possible border closure sending state and receiving state impact the likelihood that a border will be closed.

### ***Measuring Key Independent Variables***

This paper aims to assess explanations for border closers. It also compares which explanations border closers and border fence construction share. To advance this comparability goal, I draw my independent variables from Carter and Poast's study on fence erection. Below, I briefly explain data employed to examine hypotheses related to civil wars, economic inequality and territorial security.

#### ***Civil Wars***

I hypothesize that states will close crossings when dealing with shorter term challenges like refugee crises. To assess this hypothesis, I employ Uppsala Conflict Data Project's indicator of civil war incidence (UCDP, Gleditsch et al. 2002). This variable only counts civil wars in

which at least 25 battle deaths per year occur. Since I am interested in how political instability in a neighboring country can encourage a closing country to shut its frontiers, I measure whether a civil war exists in countries neighboring a prospective border closer.

### *Economic Inequality*

Work on border fences finds that economic inequality is the driving factor shaping border destabilization. However, I hypothesize that it will not be associated with border closers. This is because economic inequality is a long-term problem which a short-term solution like temporarily shutting a border is unlikely to impact. Moreover, border closers have substantial negative effects on border region markets as demonstrated by famines and economic crises previously discussed. Thus, this “solution” would exacerbate cross-border income disparities. In line with Carter and Poast’s methodology, I focus on national level income inequality. Data on income inequality near border regions is only available for 4 select years and thus does not provide sufficient temporal coverage (Nordhaus et al. 2006). To assess the effects of cross border economic inequality, I employ the ratio of state A’s GDP per capita over state B’s income per capita. Using this dyadic measure, I can assess whether country A becoming increasingly wealthy raises the probability of country A closing its border on it is poorer neighbor. I take the natural log of this measure to adjust for the data being highly positively skewed.

### *Territorial Disputes*

To examine the possibility that border closures are a reflection of disputes over the location of a border rather than indicative of fixed border conflict, I include a measure of territorial disputes. Huth, Croco, and Appel (2011) update Huth and Allee (2002) population of territorial disputes between 1919 and 2010. Moreover, territorial disputes are usually the most significant indicator of conflict between two countries. Therefore, the existence of such a dispute

within a dyad may indicate that states have military security reasons for considering closing their borders.

### ***Other Control Variables***

In addition to the highlighted independent variables, I control for several possible confounding variables drawn from the literature. Authoritarian and democratic regimes handle their border politics very differently (Mitchell 2002, Huth and Allee 2002, Gibler 2012, James, Park and Choi 2006). Certain types of autocratic regimes are especially likely to militarize their borders. Moreover, refugee flows towards autocracies and democracies differ. While the commonsense wisdom is that most refugees seek asylum in democratic countries, most actually relocate to authoritarian regimes (Breunig, Cao, and Leudtke 2012). For example, Pakistan is the world's largest refugee receiving country. Finally, a measure of regime should account for differences in human rights practices which might increase available refugee stocks. To account for these differences, I employ several dyadic measures. I employ Polity IV to determine if a country is democratic (score greater than 6) or autocratic (score between 5 and -10) (Marshall and Jaggers 2002). Dyads are then broken down into pairs. A *democratic closer/builder-autocratic neighbor* indicates that state A is democratic while the target state B is autocratic. The opposite is true for an *autocratic closer/builder-democratic neighbor*. *Autocratic Dyad* indicates that both states within a dyad have a Polity IV score less than 6. These are implicitly compared to mutually democratic dyads in all models.

Since Atzili theorizes that border fixity norms mean that states frequently do not attend to their periphery territories unless they are close to their capitals, I include a measure of capital-to-capital distance within a dyad (2012). State with border regions close to their capitals are likely to be more concerned with border stability than states with capital far from crossings. Moreover,

distance impacts the flow of goods across borders (Tingerbgen 1962, Disdier and Head 2008) and therefore may impact state's perceptions of the stability and management of those flows.

The military relationship between states within a dyad may also impact border stability. I include a variable that accounts for the ratio of military capabilities between two states. I draw this measure from the Correlates of War Composite Index of Military Capabilities (CINC) scores (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). This measure is the natural log of a ratio of the stronger state's CINC score over the weaker state's CINC score. Most military capabilities reflect a state's economic size. It is essential to ensure that my refugee and economic inequality measures are not a proxy for the balance of military capabilities.

Moreover, ally politics may impact state willingness to close borders. Allies generally enjoy relatively healthy diplomatic relationships and closing a border could sour an otherwise healthy repartee. I draw a measure of alliances from the Alliance Treaty Obligation and Provision data set (Leeds et al. 2002). This dummy variable is coded as 1 if two countries within a dyad share a formal alliance.

## **Empirical Findings**

My results present compelling evidence that states are more likely to close their borders on a neighbor involved in a civil war, but that economic inequality does not prompt states to shutout their neighbors as hypothesized by the literature. First, I discuss border closures as a phenomenon of interest for students of border politics. Then I analyze the relative rates of border closures and the presence of a neighboring state with a civil war. Finally, I employ more sophisticated analytical techniques to help control for variables known to impact border politics.

## *Describing Border Closures*

While not all states rely upon border closures, border closures are not exceptionally rare. States have closed their borders 546 times between 1980 and 2011. Relative to fence building, closures are a very common tactic for managing destabilizing flows. By comparison, states have only erected 62 walls in over 200 years (Carter and Poast 2015, 10). Border closures have also occurred on every continent except Antarctica. Figure 4 maps the number of times a country has been a border closer during the analysis period. It demonstrates that the vast majority of countries have closed one of their borders on a neighbor at least once. Darker colors indicate that a country has closed a border more frequently between 1980 and 2011. I constructed color buckets by finding the mean as well as first, second, third standard deviations, and outlying high observations. Countries closed their borders an average of 2.79 times during the observation period. Figure 4 also highlights that some counties habitually initiate border closures. The most active border closures have been Iraq (42 closures), the Democratic Republic of Congo(33), Israel(23) and China(25).

Figure 4: Border Closure By Initiator





Figure 5 plots the number of times a country has been targeted by a border closure. Color brackets were constructed using the same method described in figure 4. It shows that most states have had their border targeted by a neighbor's closure at least once. However, it also highlights that many closures target a small subset of countries rather than closures targeting being evenly dispersed among countries. The countries which have experienced the most closure targeting are Iraq(22), Syria(15), Jordan(15), and Afghanistan(15).

Figure 5: Border Closure by Target



The frequency of border closures have also varied substantially over time. Figure 6 graphs the number of closure initiations by year. The spikiness of the graph demonstrates clear year-to-year variation. However, an upwards moving time trend is also apparent. Almost half the number of closures occurs in the last decade of the available data, leaving the remaining half of closures in the first two thirds of the recorded time. Moreover, 2011 posted the highest number of closure events in a single year. Likewise, duration of closure is also highly variable. States can close their borders for as little as a day or as long as 51 years (North Korea-South Korea).



### *A First Cut of the Data*

Table 1 presents a cross tabulation of border closure and a neighbor within a direct dyad experiencing a civil war. It demonstrates that a state is more than twice as likely to close its border on a neighbor experiencing a civil war than on a neighboring state not experiencing this form of domestic strife. This is consistent with my primary hypothesis that civil wars prompt neighboring states to shut their border crossings.

<b>Table 1: Cross-border Civil War and Border Closures</b>		
	Country A Does Not Close Border	Country A Closes Border
No Civil War in Country B	98.2% <i>N</i> =34,487	1.75% <i>N</i> =616
Civil War in Country B	96.35% <i>N</i> =7,000	3.65% <i>N</i> =265
This relationship is statistically significant at the $p \leq 0.001$ level (Chi-square with one degree of freedom = 105.909, $p=0.000$ ).		

<b>Table 2: Cross-border Income Inequality and the Closure of a Border</b>		
	GDP per capita Ratio	
	High	Low
A. Median as cut point	1.73%	2.96%
Percentage of observations with closed border	<i>N</i> =444	<i>N</i> =494
B. Seventy-fifth percentile as cut point	1.68%	2.57%
Percentages of observations with closed border	<i>N</i> =289	<i>N</i> =649
<i>Note:</i> Difference in Panel A and B is statistically significant at the 0.99 confidence interval in a two-sided <i>t</i> -test.		

The literature predicts that increased economic inequality should lead to border destabilization. Therefore, more border closures may occur when there are high amounts of inequality across a frontier. Table 2 compares the rate of closed borders with differences in income inequality, employing a median cutpoint for high GDP per capita difference in one instance, and in the second panel a cutpoint at the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile to indicate “high” income

inequality. Panel A in Table 2 demonstrates that dyads with a GDP per capita ratio above the median produce a rate of border closure that is 58 percent lower than the rate of closed borders for dyads with below median ratios of GDP per capita. Likewise, Pane B in Table 3 relates the differences in GDP per capita to the existence of a border closure when the cutpoint for a “high” income inequality ratio is set to the seventy-fifth percentile (0.06). Dyads with GDP per capita ratios above the seventy-fifth percentile create a rate of border closure that is 65 percent lower than the rate of closed borders for dyads with ratios below this threshold. Contrary to literature-derived expectations, a naïve comparison of both panels indicates that a lower GDP per capita ratio is associated with border closures. Unlike fence building, wealthy states do not close their borders on their significantly poorer neighbors.

### ***Multivariate Analysis***

Confounders may complicate these relationships. Cross-tabulations are also a poor tool for comparing the explanatory power of competing explanations. Multivariate analysis counteracts these shortfalls. I estimate several logit regression models to assess whether the presence of a civil war in a neighboring country increases the probability a state will close its borders. I compare these findings to models of fence building, highlighting how measurements of border instability greatly impact a researcher’s conclusions. I include models with dyadic fixed effects to ensure that estimates derive from within-dyad variation, rather than cross-dyad variation. However, fixed effects drops observations in which there was never a border closure. It also eliminates observations for which a border has been closed for all sampled years. This is because estimating fixed effects requires dyads with temporal variation in the outcome variable (King 2001). I also employ random effects logit models because this form captures unobserved heterogeneity between groups without removing dyads lacking variation in the dependent

variable (King 2001). While fixed effects drops observations and thus reduces statistical power, a random effects model also has an important trade off. These models assume exogeneity between the observed covariates and the dyad-specific intercept. I present naïve, random effects, and fixed effects logit models to increase the reader's confidence that model selection does not alter my findings.

**Table 3: Directed Dyadic Tests of Theories of Border Instability as Measured by Border Closures and Fences**

	<u>Border Closure Presence</u>			<u>Border Fence Presence</u>		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Neighbor Civil War	0.259 <sup>0.004</sup> (0.090)	0.252 <sup>0.030</sup> (0.116)	0.212 <sup>0.072</sup> (0.118)	- 0.459 <sup>0.004</sup> (0.16)	-1.876 <sup>-0.001</sup> (0.286)	- 1.935 <sup>-0.001</sup> (0.298)
Directed Income Inequality	-0.046 <sup>0.395</sup> (0.048)	- 0.072 <sup>0.212</sup> (0.057)	- 0.074 <sup>0.209</sup> (0.059)	1.32 <sup>-0.001</sup> (0.109)	1.681 <sup>-0.001</sup> (0.132)	1.641 <sup>-0.001</sup> (0.130)
Territorial Disputes	1.104 <sup>-0.001</sup> (0.092)	0.793 <sup>0.002</sup> (0.254)	0.245 <sup>0.441</sup> (0.317)	1.955 <sup>-0.001</sup> (0.124)	1.166 <sup>0.010</sup> (0.454)	0.466 <sup>0.403</sup> (0.557)
Democratic Closer/Builder-	1.195 <sup>-0.001</sup> (0.132)	1.169 <sup>-0.001</sup> (0.184)	0.968 <sup>-0.001</sup> (0.196)	1.287 <sup>-0.001</sup> (0.181)	0.554 <sup>0.076</sup> (0.312)	0.220 <sup>0.497</sup> (0.324)
Autocratic Closer/Builder-	1.093 <sup>-0.001</sup> (0.135)	0.493 <sup>0.011</sup> (0.195)	0.184 <sup>0.375</sup> (0.207)	0.793 <sup>-0.001</sup> (0.197)	-0.688 <sup>0.071</sup> (0.381)	- 1.113 <sup>0.009</sup> (0.427)
Autocratic Dyad	1.261 <sup>-0.001</sup> (0.122)	1.161 <sup>-0.001</sup> (0.193)	0.665 <sup>0.002</sup> (0.216)	0.561 <sup>0.002</sup> (0.183)	-0.390 <sup>0.299</sup> (0.376)	0.824 <sup>0.048</sup> (0.417)
Log of Distance	-0.035 <sup>0.465</sup> (0.047)	- 0.111 <sup>0.454</sup> (0.148)		- 0.496 <sup>-0.001</sup> (0.046)	-0.269 <sup>0.473</sup> (0.375)	
Allies	0.259 <sup>0.002</sup> (0.085)	0.236 <sup>0.145</sup> (0.162)	0.206 <sup>0.277</sup> (0.19)	- 0.162 <sup>0.204</sup> (0.128)	0.927 <sup>0.001</sup> (0.289)	1.060 <sup>0.001</sup> (0.307)
Capability Ratio	-0.085 <sup>0.003</sup> (0.029)	- 0.182 <sup>0.016</sup> (0.075)	0.175 <sup>0.256</sup> (.154)	- 0.143 <sup>-0.001</sup> (0.033)	-0.804 <sup>0.001</sup> (0.234)	- 1.234 <sup>-0.001</sup> (0.334)

Constant	-	-	-	-		
	4.982 <sup>&lt;0.001</sup>	6.399 <sup>&lt;0.001</sup>		2.303 <sup>&lt;0.001</sup>	12.631 <sup>&lt;0.001</sup>	
	(0.359)	(1.071)		(0.307)	(2.745)	
Dyad Random Effects	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Dyad Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
N	27405	27405	8189	27405	27405	1324

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*Notes: two-tailed p-values in italicized superscripts, standard errors in parentheses.*

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Table 3 shows the results of directed dyadic models for both closing border and fence building. Models 1-3 use the binary dependent variable of border closure, which is coded 1 if state A closed its border with State B in year  $t$  and zero otherwise. I compare these results to Carter and Poast's findings concerning the presence of a border wall. Models 4-6 employ a binary dependent variable coded 1 if a wall exists between States A and B in year  $t$  and zero if not. Models 1 and 4 are pooled models with no dyadic-specific fixed effects. Model 2 and 5 include random effects. Finally, model 3 and 6 rely upon fixed effects.

My key theoretical variable of interest is the effect of a civil war within country B on country A's likelihood of closing its shared border. Table 3 demonstrates that civil war in a neighboring state is positively and significantly associated with border closures. This is true even in the fixed effect model, though the significance level drops to the  $p < 0.1$  level due to the substantial reduction in sample size associated with this technique. Model 1 substantively shows that if country B moves from not having civil war to becoming embroiled in internal conflict, the odds that country A closes its border increases by 29.6%.

Contrary to previous findings on border instability, there is no statistically significant relationship between cross border income inequality and the wealthier state closing its border. Moreover, across all model specifications, the negative coefficient runs counter to the border stability literature's current hypotheses. The direction of the coefficient weakly implies that states are less likely to close their borders as a neighboring state gets relatively poorer. However,

Carter and Poast's Models 4-6 provide strong evidence that cross border economic inequality is an important predictor of the presence of a border wall. The divergence between Models 1-3 and 4-6 suggests that researchers should carefully select their metrics when including border instability within their models. These data are consistent with the hypothesis that states will chose different strategies when dealing with short term crises as opposed to long term challenges like economic differences.

Models of the border closure and border fence dependent variables provide some, though inconsistent support for the notion that territorial disputes impact border instability. I can draw no statistically significant conclusions from both fixed effects model. This implies that when a dyad has a territorial dispute, the closer/builder state is more likely to close a border or create a wall. However, the presence of a territorial dispute is not a great predictor of whether a border will remain closed or a border wall stay in place. While a security rationale cannot be fully discounted, civil war more consistently predicts border closures and economic inequality more reliably forecasts border fences.

Confounding variables behave largely as expected regardless of choice of border instability measure, though statistical significance varies across model specification. The models consider the effect of joint regime type on border management by dividing joint regime type into three variables: *democratic builder/closer-autocratic neighbor*, *autocratic closer/builder-democratic neighbor*, and *mutual autocratic dyad*. Remember: the comparison case is mutually democratic dyads. The results from Models 1-3 suggest that all forms of regime type are willing to close their borders on neighboring states in crisis. However, Models 4-6's findings imply that democracies are more consistently likely to build fences on autocratic neighbors than autocrats on democracies and mutual autocracies. Though not significant across

all specifications, the distance between capitals and capabilities ratios are generally negative. Allies is the only other variable of note when comparing Models 1-3 and 4-6. It is only sporadically significant, but it indicates that allies are more willing to close a border on a neighbor in crisis, while less likely to build a fence. This softly suggests that states might select weaker border management strategies when dealing with allies.

I run a number of robustness checks and also drop potentially influential closing countries and target countries to ensure that my results are not shaped by the behavior of a few outliers. Dropping countries both individually and as a group has no substantive impact on my findings. Interestingly, Israel appears to behave differently from most of the border closing countries in the sample. Dropping Israel from the analysis, strengthens my finding. This likely stems from the fact that much of Israel's external border closures attempt to manage an internal conflict over the Palestinian territories.

## **Conclusion**

Previous work on border fences has helpfully turned the discipline towards considering the politics of how states manage their border flows. The literature finds that economic inequality is the primary factor undermining the good functioning of international borders. However, this is incomplete on theoretical as well as empirical grounds. I broaden the range of border control tactics to include a spectrum of actions from doing nothing, to adding more guards, to closing a border, and finally, to building a border fence. I correct for past studies of border control that truncate management techniques by examining only one border control technique.

While previous studies of border instability have ruled out civil wars as a cause, I find that civil wars are strongly associated with border closures. I also observe that economic

inequality is not associated with border closures, in contrast to its previously discovered strong association with fence-building. I provide a single theoretical framework that compellingly explains why states close their borders during civil wars but not in the face of economic disparity. I argue that states adapt their control practices to the duration and intensity of their border challenge. States accomplish this by embracing a border strategy with the necessary cost, flexibility, and efficacy to solve the crisis.

Beyond providing important insights into the study of border control regimes, I also introduce a new dataset on border closures. Closed borders are a common precursor to the emergence of more serious territorial conflict between states. Since border closures presage other types of disputes, this data and future tracking of closing borders provides a potentially useful early warning system on the development and escalation of conflict internationally. Milton Friedman famously argued, “The ultimate goal of positive science is the development of a ‘theory’ or, a ‘hypothesis’ that yields valuable and meaningful (i.e. not truistic) about phenomena not yet observed” (1953). International Relations has consistently fallen short of this goal. Being able to better predict the emergence of conflict gives leaders more opportunities to negotiate down tensions before they boil over into war or produce enduring rivalries.

Treating border closures as an early warning for the development of more serious disputes also has implications for the research community. How states select into territorial disputes is an open question within the territorial claims agenda (Huth 1996). Statistical studies of territorial disputes and their escalation largely fail to account for these selection effects because correctly identifying non-events for territorial claims remains problematic. Since states choose which lands to claim and which territorial demands to negotiate away, strategic censoring endemically effects statistical models of territorial conflict. Factors driving border closures also

likely drive territorial claims making and escalation. Yet border closures are a relatively cheaper and early step along the path towards territorial claims emergence. This new data on border closures provides a new resource for scholars to examine territorial dispute emergence. Moreover, two-step models that employ border closures as a selection mechanism in the first stage, may improve inferences about territorial dispute escalation.

Figure 2 places several types of crisis along an idealized space defined by the duration and intensity of the crisis. Future research should examine how states manage different types of border challenges. First and foremost, incorporating border closure data should advance the terrorism research agenda. The field has produced many studies that predict when terrorism emerges (Kydd, Andrew and Walter 2006; McCormick 2003; Lee 2011; Hegghammer 2013; Pape 2003; Wade and Reiter 2007; Li 2005), when state policy succeeds or fails to address terrorism (Bueno de Mesquita 2005; 2007; Walsh and Piazza 2010; Azam and Thelen 2010; Powell 2007; Dragu 2011), and the political impacts of terrorism (Berrebi and Klor 2008; Carter 2012; Abrahms 2012; Kibris 2010). However, the war on terror framework has had an outsized impact on this field. Many studies focus on militarized tactics for dealing with this threat. Focusing on non-militarized ways states mitigate terrorism would provide a helpful corrective to this trend.

While the current refugee crisis in Europe and cascade of border closures likely has significant effects on the welfare of refugees as well as the distribution of aid provision in refugee hosting, no current research exists to fully assess the implications of border closures as a tactic. Future research should thus focus on the effects of border closures. This paper has posited that these effects could be highly negative, at least in border regions, based on some anecdotal evidence. However, a more systematic analysis may help refugee advocates and leaders



concerned about border management develop more humane policies that could benefit Syrians, host countries, and future refugee groups. Likewise, research should focus on the impacts of other border management techniques, since explaining the emergence of border management tactics has been the sole focus of the research agenda to date.

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## PAPER 3

### CLOSED BORDERS, OPEN PALMS: THE REFUGEE-HOSTAGE DILEMMA

#### **Introduction:**

Although Syria's civil war has caused inestimable suffering, scholars and commentators seek to quantify the pain experienced by the Syrian people. The number of refugees pouring out of the country in a desperate attempt to escape commonly serves as a proxy. The United Nations estimates 4.8 million people sought refuge across the region. More have elected the dangerous trek to find sanctuary in Europe. Some European countries have been exceptionally welcoming to the massive flood of refugees. Despite the crisis taxing Germany's infrastructure, Angela Merkel has held the door firmly open to all arriving Syrians, saying, "The fundamental right to asylum for the politically persecuted knows no upper limit; that also goes for refugees who come to us from the hell of a civil war" (quoted in *ABC News* 2015). However, other countries have not been so consistently obliging.

Macedonia has closed its borders to migrating war victims on several recent occasions. Refugees escaping Syria often first pass into Turkey. However, Turkey only allows refugees to seek temporary protection. Many refugees thus try to enter Europe, hoping for access to more permanent safety. From Turkey, they cross the Aegean Sea in makeshift, over-filled boats with poor or no safety equipment. Once in Greece, the refugees make an overland journey across several countries, including Macedonia, to reach Germany. While Macedonia officially allows Syrians to pass through its borders if their final destination is Germany, in practice, they often bar the way. It first halted admittances briefly in August 2015. In November 2015, Macedonia

erected a border fence along its Greek border. In early December 2015, it formally closed its border posts for two days, and returned to closure during late January 2016. Presently, the way has been closed since March 2016.

Knowing these refugees sought protection in wealthy, welcoming countries such as Germany, Sweden, or the Netherlands, why did Macedonia deny them passage? This paper will explore how states use border controls to address refugee flows. It will attempt to address an empirical puzzle: why do some states close and reopen their borders to refugees multiple times throughout a single crisis?

Understanding how states control their borders during a crisis remains crucial within International Relations scholarship. The influx of refugees from neighboring countries represents one of the challenges border agents and state leaders face. Refugee flows can tax a receiving country's resources. Refugees, and the governments which accept them, often elicit the ire of substantial portions of the receiving country's population. Extraterritorial fighters can masquerade as refugees, threatening to expand a conflict to include the receiving country. Refugee-accepting states thus present a puzzle for students of state behavior. If refugee flows threaten the domestic tranquility of a receiving state, why do states ever accept people fleeing neighboring conflicts?

Work on this question focuses on the emergence of a refugee protection norm. Under this humanitarian norm, states have a moral obligation to aid those fleeing conflict, even if to do so proves costly. The "refugee protection norm" has been enshrined in international and domestic legal frameworks. Other scholars have noted that states may be more willing to bear the costs of hosting refugees when coethnic ties exist between the fleeing group and the receiving country. In

contrast to proponents of a universal humanitarian norm, coethnic explanations suggest that a narrower humanitarian impulse drives states to welcome displaced people.

In either case, arguments that focus on the negative effects of hosting refugees and the normative pressure to do so miss a key empirical fact. States sometimes open and shut their doors multiple times during the same conflict. Much media attention on closures focuses on the apparent negative externalities associated with housing or helping transport refugees, but these negative externalities exist continuously. Likewise, international legal protections and strong norms against *refoulement*—forcing a refugee back into a dangerous situation by expelling them from a host country—have existed since at least the 1950s. Even coethnicity ties do not vary within a single crisis. These continuous conditions insufficiently explain the discontinuous patterns of border closure and re-opening observed over various modern conflicts.

When a host country rejects refugees, it rarely acts from a pure desire to avoid the downsides of protecting war-weary people. Moreover, when it accepts refugees, its impulses may not be purely humanitarian. This paper argues that greed may fuel some states' refugee-border policies.

In a refugee-supportive norms environment with wealthy international donors, states have an incentive to hold refugees hostage for increased aid flows. This aid can take several forms. At its crudest, a receiving government may demand a direct cash transfer to open the border—as Turkey did after closing its Bab al-Salameh crossing with Syria in 2016, and Uzbekistan did in 2010. Governments might also seek to benefit from international technical aid or infrastructure projects. Refugee hosts often strategically locate refugee camps to promote development in poorer regions of their country as Kazakhstan did in 2010. By demanding more roads, hospitals, and schools, a host can spur the economic integration of an undeveloped region.

Use of local contractors and NGOs to provision services also functions as a potential avenue of profit for receiving nations. Most international donors eschew local contractors precisely to avoid transforming aid into a source of rent seeking for host governments. However, some host countries successfully demand that the international donor community work with local agencies. For example, Chad has leveraged intermittent border closures to encourage the international donor community to work with local Chadian partners in the provision of some aid since 2014.

Some states thus close their borders to displaced people until they can extract additional aid revenue from the international community. No current scholarly work examines how receiving countries manipulate border closure to moderate or even benefit from refugee flows. This paper fills that gap in the literature.

My argument develops in five parts. First, I examine relevant studies of refugee policy and border control policies. Next, I introduce a game theoretic model demonstrating the interaction between an international donor and possible refugee host states. I also discuss case selection strategy. Afterwards, I examine the empirical implications of the proposed model in two modern case studies: Tanzania's border controls and refugee policy during the Burundian civil war and Rwandan Genocide, as well as Macedonia's border policy during Kosovo's refugee crisis. I conclude with a discussion of potential solutions to the dilemma I identify, and point the way towards future research extensions.

### **Origins of Variation in Refugee Policy**

International Security scholars have focused on the destabilizing nature of refugees. Refugees account for some dispersion of civil war across borders (Weiner 1996, Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). They can support or provide justification for violent third-party interventions in



civil wars (Salehyan 2009; Gelditsch et al. 2008). Refugees can also impact domestic politics and cause backlash within receiving states (Keely and Russell 1994; Cornelius et al. 2004). Because not all countries are equally able to request aid or integrate influxes of refugees with their populations, refugees are often seen as costly to keep, potentially destabilizing to job markets, and (sadly) a threat to the cultural fabric of the receiving country. Karen Jacobson finds these factors can impact refugee policy substantially (1996; Crisp 2000; McBride 1999; Bloch 2008).

If refugees are so dangerous and destabilizing to host, why do receiving countries accept them at all? The literature largely focuses on the force of international law and humanitarian normative considerations as compellents, pushing states to host refugees (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Jacobson 1996; Cortell and Davis 1996). The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees enshrined non-refoulment within International Law. Non-refoulment is the legal responsibility not to expel refugees into jurisdictions where they might be killed or persecuted (Goodwin-Gil and McAdam 2007). However, signatory states vary in their willingness to accept refugees. For example, while some gulf Arab states have refused to accept Syrian refugees, Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon have been welcoming to those affected by Syria's civil war. Gibney explores several hypotheses to explain interstate variation in refugee hosting: differences in the cost of hosting, the health of a potential host country's economy, its integration history, its population, and the actions of other states (1999). Domestic political variation and media attention within a possible host country also help to explain variation in refugee acceptance (Salehyan and Rosenblum 2008). Likewise, diplomatic and military affinity with the country of origin may also explain why some states only selectively refuse refugees (Salehyan and Rosenblum 2004; Loescher 1993).

Another important factor influencing refugee policy is the role of international third-party aid. Housing refugees can be expensive. International organizations and leading developed nations often provide aid to host countries to offset costs. The donor community sometimes gives cash transfers to hosting countries, or offers preferential loans to incentivize host states. More commonly, donors provide technical aid and build capital projects within a host country. For instance, UNHCR aid largely takes the form of managing refugee camps and addressing refugee health and welfare needs. As an externality, its camp projects may also benefit locals by better integrating underdeveloped border regions with the host country's capital.

Balla and Reinhardt find that countries bordering a conflict receive increased aid while countries in conflict receive less (2008; Bruck and Xu 2012). But this work focuses on the behavior of donors exclusively. Aid receiving states are not seen as agents within models of bilateral peace aid. This paper addresses a weakness in the literature by examining one possible strategy host states use to increase their aid when dealing with refugees. Namely, receiving countries threaten not to host refugees until they secure larger aid flows.

### **Bordering on Refugees: Border Management and Conflict**

Past Political Science research into borders has largely fixated on when states fight over the location of borders (Vasquez 1993; Kocs 1995; Diehl 1999; Hensel 2000; Senese 2005; Huth and Allee 2002; James, Park and Choi 2006; Mitchell and Hensel 2007). More recently, an emerging new school examines how states manage their fixed borders, and how these management techniques can exacerbate conflict or cement peace. Border Institutionalists posit that important patterns of state behavior and conflict are unintelligible without accounting for the often long-ranging impact of having lines on maps, even when those lines are long-uncontested. Borders themselves can facilitate peace, or disputes simply by existing. While Carter and

Goemans find that the presence of past administrative frontiers act as a focal point in negotiating new frontiers (2011; 2014), Abrahamson and Carter note that multiple historical jurisdictions near a border produce more territorial disputes, because the involved states do not share a coordinated vision (2016).

The Institutionalist Approach has fruitfully enriched this field's understanding of territorial dispute settlements. Simmons notes that well-functioning borders offer substantial economic advantages by reducing uncertainty, minimizing transaction costs, and limiting the negative externalities disputes produce (2005). The Institutional Approach adds dimension to the study of territory and conflict by noting that states bargaining over land do not necessarily play a zero-sum game. Dispute resolution and properly functioning, mutually agreed upon borders provide joint gains.

In addition its clarification of key territorial questions, the Institutional Approach has also addressed the effect of border management on non-territorial disagreements. Carter and Poast assert that states fortify existing borders with walls to protect themselves from the effects of extreme economic inequality (2015). Likewise, Gavrilis argues that effective border management<sup>1</sup> emerges when states mutually decentralize their control of borders and empower their border agents to work cooperatively across the line (2009). The Institutionalist Approach has even helped illuminate new patterns in the study of International Relations' only robust systematic law: that mutual democracy effectively stifles the emergence of war within a dyad as territorial peace may proceed the emergence of democratic regions and their contingent peace (Gibler 2009).

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<sup>1</sup> Gavrilis defines "effective border management" as better controls of flows of goods and people and fewer diplomatic incidents.

Yet, the Institutional Approach to borders remains a burgeoning field of inquiry. Now that it has established its relevance by addressing key territoriality questions, and shown that conflict can emerge over fixed borders, more scholarship should examine the causes and effects of fixed border conflict. This paper begins to fill that gap by addressing the effects of refugee flows and international aid on border management.

The next section develops a model simulating a receiving state's border policy when facing a refugee crisis. It notes that humanitarian-influenced donors can be coerced into providing more funds to a receiving state. Receiving states close their borders to refugees to bargain for a more favorable aid allocation.

### **Refugee-Hostage Dilemma: Model and Methods**

This section develops a model of refugee-host border management with benevolent third-party aid. The model's equilibrium state reveals a striking fact: receiving states sometimes have an incentive to close their borders on those escaping war and strife. This incentive is strongest when aid agencies are most concerned with humanitarian outcomes. Thus, a dilemma emerges. Aid agencies that most want to help refugees and accepting countries may unintentionally encourage their use as hostages in an international bargaining game. Border closures, even when they are relatively short, prolong refugee exposure to violence, oppression, and disease. Untempered humanitarian aims may thus produce inhumane border policy, creating a variation of the Samaritan's Dilemma (Trosvik 2005).

The Refugee-Hostage Dilemma develops because aid guarantors and aid recipients may have incompatible interests. In line with previous research, I assume that humanitarian goals motivate aid-giving states and institutions. Aid-providing states and agencies donate in order to incentivize recipient countries to increase their refugee intake. They thus grant aid to offset the

costs of hosting refugees. Refugee-receiving countries' aims are not so clear. They may share humanitarian impulses with donor countries, but they may also seek aid for non-humanitarian purposes. Host countries can thus extort funding from altruistic sources by passively threatening refugees. Border closure represents one example of passively endangering people fleeing conflict to garner more funding. Following the enumeration of the model's formal logic, the section closes with a reflection on whether its theorized effects operate in the real world.

### ***The Model:***

Consider a two period model with a single donor and two possible host/aid recipient states. The budget constraints for state  $i$  in time period 1 and 2 are given below:

$$g_{1i} + r_i \leq w$$

$$g_{2i} + a_i \leq W_i$$

In the first period, host country  $i$  allocates a given endowment  $w$  between domestic government spending,  $g_{1i}$ , and spending on refugee care,  $r_{1i}$ , where  $r_{1i} \geq 0$ . Government  $i$ 's resources in the second period,  $W_i$ , depends on the state of the world. Assume that if  $r_{1i} = 0$  in period 1, this represents the country  $i$  closing its borders to refugees. In period 2, the host government allocates between consumptive spending,  $g_{2i}$ , and aid spending  $a_i$ .

The state of the world can be good or bad with a known probability. Resources available to the state in the second period will be higher in the good state than the bad:  $\gamma > \beta > 0$ . Therefore the government  $i$ 's resources in the second period can be represented as:

$$W_i = \begin{cases} \gamma & \text{for probability } q, \\ \beta & \text{for probability } 1-q. \end{cases}$$

Note, in a two-country model there are four possible aggregate states because the state of the world is independently determined for each country. This generalizing assumption further has

logical underpinnings. Namely, that the economic conditions favorable to one country need not necessarily enrich another country. The set of states is as follows:

$$(W_1, W_2) = \begin{cases} (\gamma, \gamma) & \text{for probability } q(r_1)q(r_2) , \\ (\gamma, \beta) & \text{for probability } q(r_1)(1-q(r_2)) , \\ (\beta, \gamma) & \text{for probability } (1-q(r_1))q(r_2) , \\ (\beta, \beta) & \text{for probability } (1-q(r_1))(1-q(r_2)) . \end{cases}$$

Let  $S$  represent this full set of possible states and,  $s$ , represent a specific combined realized state.

Assume donors give aid for refugee care due to humanitarian motives. From the humanitarian principle: donors desire to give more aid to the country least able to absorb refugees. Therefore, if a donor gave more aid to a state in a good condition than a state in a bad condition, this would be a suboptimal outcome. Following Svensson's example (2000), I conceptualize aid as a good or service, in period 2, used to benefit refugees and the receiving country's poor. The production function for this aid is as follows:

$$h_i = h(d_i)$$

where  $h$  is an increasing, concave function and  $d_i$  is the level of humanitarian aid assistance country  $i$  receives. Refugees derive utility from the good which can be produced either from the donor's or the host country's resources. Total refugee consumption in host country  $i$  is

$$c_i = a_i + h(d_i)$$

Host country  $i$ 's utility is an additive function consisting of its constant marginal utility from consumptive spending in the first period and total public spending in time 2, represented by  $f(t_i)$ :

$$U_i = \delta g_i + f(t_i)$$

Assume monotonically increasing, concave host preferences.

The donor also has a budget constraint for supporting refugees. Let  $B$  represent their fixed funding endowment:

$$B = d_1(s) + d_2(s) \quad s \in S$$

where  $d_i$  corresponds to the donor's gift to country  $i$  when in a realized aggregate state  $s$  from the set of all possible aggregate states  $S$ . Assume that this budget is “use-it-or-lose-it” in nature. This assumption derives logically from the extensive literature on bureaucratic budgetary politics. A donor organization failing to spend its full budget demonstrates to its principals that it does not need as extensive budget and thus will receive less funding in the future. Bureaucratic organizations want to protect their budgets in case they have greater capacity needs in the future, and thus will spend rather than save a budget to keep consistently high or increasing funding levels.

### ***Host versus Benevolent Donor Refugee Aid Equilibria***

Backwards induction demonstrates that the *ex post* incentives of benevolent refugee agencies, and the *ex ante* incentives of receiving countries' conflict. In period two, the donor dispenses aid between the two countries. Since the donor's preferences are humanitarian in nature, these preferences are a combination of the total refugee consumption occurring in both countries. Setting the first derivative to 0 optimizes these preferences, giving:

$$f'(C_i(s))h'(d_1(s)) - f'(C_2(s))h'(d_2(s)) = 0 \quad \forall s \in S$$

where  $C_1(s)$  represents the total refugee consumption in country  $i$ , in a given state of the world and interstate refugee donations  $d_i(s)$  at Nash Equilibrium in the last stage of the game. By the principle of concavity, the first order derivative is the maximum rather than the minimum. Thus, second order conditions need not be calculated. The intuitive interpretation of the first order

condition is that interstate refugee support will go to the country presenting as most in need, *ex post*.

The two host countries non-cooperatively divide their first period budget between domestic government spending and spending on refugee care. The equilibrium refugee donations represented by the previous equation then constrain each potential host country's optimization. To optimize, I substitute the refugee donation flows into the host country utility function and differentiate with respect to the host country's own refugee allocations:

$$q'(r_i)[(q(r_j)f(C_i(\gamma, \gamma)) + (1 - q(r_j))f(C_i(\gamma, \beta)) - q(r_j)f(C_i(\beta, \gamma)) - (1 - q(r_j))f(C_i(\beta, \beta)))] = \delta,$$

for  $i = 1, 2; j = 2, 1$  where  $j \neq i$

In plain English, at this equilibrium, because the donor always wants to provide aid to the state least able to support refugees, states have an incentive to shift money from their own refugee support budgets towards other government projects. In extreme cases, this implies that the country with poorer economic health has an incentive to fully defund their own refugee sponsorship. Remember, when  $r_i = 0$ , the intuitive interpretation of this is that country  $i$  has closed its borders to refugees. Reality reflects this model choice; the mere act of processing refugee flows at a border incurs additional costs for the state. Costs stem from the additional hours border guards and customs agents work, as well as the cost of legal enforcement when customs agents find contraband on refugees. The border-closing state has clear incentive to endanger refugees for a period of time in order to extract more donor support. Donors pay states with closed borders more aid than they would otherwise, to coax recipient states to open their borders and remove refugees from dangerous conditions. The classic Samaritan Dilemma shifts into a Hostage Dilemma with the lives of refugees held in the balance. A purely humanitarian impulse on the part of donors may therefore have inhumane outcomes.



### ***Methods, Case Selection, Empirical Implications of the Model***

To assess the empirical implications of my model, I adopt an analytical narratives approach (Bates et al. 1998). Combining rational choice approaches with historical analysis provides additional rigor to case study research. Formalizing the causal process at play encourages qualitative scholars to isolate key variables and mechanisms, and thus fosters more parsimonious analysis than traditional case-based research. This method also demands that the formal scholar contextualize their simple models with the messiness of actual politics.

The analytic narrative approach becomes especially useful when the researcher is motivated by a limited number of highly salient cases (Bates et al. 2000). While there have been several instances of border closures between 1980 and the present (see Paper 2), as well as many refugee crises, the puzzle motivating this paper focuses on the effects of especially large-scale crises. Most refugee flows do not number in the hundreds of thousands or millions. Large-scale crises moreover pose special challenges to states.

The approach, moreover, provides scholars with a way to theorize from a puzzling case, while drawing out implications that can be examined by elements of that case which did not originally motivate the research. Thus, a formal model allows both an in and out-of-sample case analysis. Analytic narrative techniques facilitate the disaggregation of single case into many observations by focusing on several separate empirical implications. However, the gold standard approach to analytical narratives still seeks out an additional case to serve as a truly out-of-sample test. I adopt the technique of testing multiple empirical implications of my model within two cases to fully validate my model.

Analytic narrative case selection focuses on substantively important or crucial cases, often the case which motivated the researcher's original insight. I select two crucial cases:

Tanzania's border policy during the Great Lakes Crisis and Macedonia's border policy during the war in Kosovo. Both conflicts generated massive refugees flows that threatened to destabilize existing refugee protection norms and are thus good proxies for the current Syria emergency. In addition to being a crucial case, I select Tanzania because it represents a relative hard test of my theory due to presence of several compelling alternative explanations. By combining crucial and hard case analysis, I thus set a high bar for testing the implications of my model.

I derive several falsifiable implications from my model. The first implication of the model is that funding concerns motivate a hosting country to shut their borders. Examining motivations in international relations is tricky due to its strategic nature. In addition to examining interview data and the actors' own explanations for their actions, for each case, I compare whether host nation behaviors consistently reflect competing theoretical motives for border closure. If other motives predominate or financial motives seem implausible, the reader should reject my model.

The next implication is that aid-receiving countries compete with other countries for a slice of a limited refugee aid pie. Explicit evidence of this competition can take several forms. States can attempt to shift hosting burden to other countries by arguing that the other country is more equipped to handle the influx. They may argue that it is costlier for their country to host a refugee than a competing country, as Turkey consistently has done when Kurdish regions produce refugee flows. They may actively scale back prior support for refugees to further bolster their claims. The model implies that only one country will be able to make these arguments especially effectively. Moreover, it predicts that the country that is more impacted by the conflict will be the border closer while the other country will find it difficult to shirk its responsibilities to refugees.

A sealed border must actively endanger refugees to trigger the donors' humanitarian impulses. This implies that receiving states will maximize their bargaining leverage when violence is especially protracted and severe in the conflict-originating state. The hostage dilemma thus obtains more often during especially bad crises. Evidence for this hypothesis includes active endangerment of the fleeing population by the receiving state. In addition to the border closure itself (which should be discounted to avoid tautology), poor or violent treatment of arriving refugees corresponds with attempts to trigger the international humanitarian community's sympathy.

The final implication is that closing hosts will specifically link the border closure to funding demands. Failing to request more aid would demonstrate a lack of issue linkage. Moreover, the rejecting host should accept refugees after the international community pays its "ransom" demand. If the host demands more aid to open the border, receives the aid, and fails to open the border, this would endanger their credibility with the international community. A blow to reputation could potentially remove the host's ability to make future funding demands. The iterative nature of international politics thus implies that paid ransoms will produce at least sporadically open borders.

The next two sections examine the plausibility of this outcome in real world cases. The first case examines Tanzania's refugee policy during the early phases of Burundi's long running civil war. The second case looks at Macedonia's border policy during the Kosovo War.

### **Case Study 1: Tanzania/Burundi-Rwanda Border Closures**

Tensions between Burundi's Hutu and Tutsi populations turned violent after Tutsi extremists killed the country's first Hutu president, Melchor Ndadaye. Between 1993 and 2006, Burundi and Rwanda erupted into civil war and genocide. Over 300,000 Burundians died during

this period. At the height of the conflict in 1995, Tanzania hosted 570,000 of the estimated 2.1 million total refugees streaming from these two countries. The refugee crisis developed incredibly quickly. Marking the fastest, large-scale refugee exodus in history, 250,000 refugees crossed into Tanzania through a single checkpoint in just one day.

While it allowed large numbers of refugees into the country, and maintained one of the most generous refugee policies throughout the early 1990s, Tanzania still closed its borders with Burundi and Rwanda intermittently several times through the conflict. Tanzanian leaders linked these closures to demands for more aid and burden sharing. However, the Tanzania-Burundi border closures of the mid-90s represent a hard case for the model. The model predicts that countries close their borders when bargaining with international donors. Tanzania represents an excellent case to compare the model's predictions to several possible alternative explanations. Security concerns, both internal and interstate, could have motivated Tanzania to close its borders on Burundi (Brahim 1995; Milner 2000; Black 1998). It is possible that the magnitude of the crisis was too disruptive for Tanzania to accommodate (Whitaker 2008; Whitaker 2002; Long 2010; Rutwina 1996; Crisp and Jacobsen 1998). These explanations, on their face, seem more plausible than the model's predictions, but will be demonstrated to be inconsistent with Tanzanian policy and behavior. This section will elaborate on potential counter-explanations, explain why they should be eliminated as viable causes of the border closures, and close with a discussion of the model's implications.

Hosting refugee populations can tax a government's security forces. The nature of the violence during the Great Lake Crisis was particularly difficult for refugee-accepting states to manage. Combatants regularly masqueraded among refugees seeking asylum. Both Hutu and Tutsi militias used the camps as bases to regroup before returning to the fray. Fighters hiding in

the camps attacked their fellow refugees, harming opposition leaders along with non-co-ethnics. In one notable case, Zaire hosted Tutsi refugee camps while its military forces allied with Hutu combatants. Zairian and Hutu forces attempted to ethnically cleanse the Tutsi camps. Tutsis in Zaire thus formed self-protection militias and retreated further from their Zairian hosts. Observing Zaire's destabilization, Tanzania had strong security motives to deny refugees access to its territory.

Moreover, the Tanzanian government linked the presence of well-armed refugees to an uptick in local crime in Western Tanzania, though the region was considered relatively lawless before the influx. Joseph Rwegasira, Tanzania's Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, argued that refugees murdered 67 Tanzanians and stole property worth more than 150 million shillings in the Kagera region alone (*The Guardian[Tanzania]* 1995). Responding to the influx of weapons within the country, Tanzania's Home Affairs Minister, Ernest Nyanda, stated, "There is no government which will tolerate free entry of dangerous weapons likely to endanger the lives of its citizens," (quoted in *Inter Press Services* 1995). However, Johnson Brahim, a senior official in Tanzania's department of refugees, noted that local Tanzanians were involved in a majority of crimes attributed to refugees (1995). In Kigoma, 38 local Tanzanians were murdered compared to 55 refugees, indicating that refugees also bore a significant brunt of any increased crime (*ibid.*). Upon closing its border with Burundi, Tanzania's Prime Minister highlighted internal and external security motives: "The gravity of the situation, especially for those coming from Burundi and Rwanda, has made it inevitable for Tanzania to take appropriate security measures by closing her border with Burundi and Rwanda," (quoted in James C. Hathaway, *The Rights of Refugees Under International Law*, (Cambridge University Press, 2005).

However, regional experts have consistently noted that these fears were overblown, and acted as cover for Tanzania's violation of the *non-refoulment* norm (Whitaker 2008; Rutinwa and Kamanga 2003). This suggests that Tanzanian leaders latched on to the security explanation in order to justify their controversial violation of international norms. They sought to appeal to another well-entrenched norm: that a state's first duty is to defend its populace. Most damaging to an internal security account though, is Tanzanian policy before and after the border closures. If the security alternative explanation really accounts for the border closure, Tanzania should have implemented policies prior to the closure to mitigate these security concerns. Tanzanian policy demonstrated no such attempts.

During both phases, Tanzania abdicated its policing and security responsibilities within the refugee camps. Rutinwa explains the government's position:

...Asked to respond to charges that Tanzania was harboring armed elements in Burundian refugee camps in Tanzania, Mr Jakaya Kikwete, the Tanzanian Foreign Minister replied that Tanzania had no responsibility for whatever transpired in the camps...Refugee camps were "UNHCR Islands" in which the Tanzanian government had no role, apart from providing security around them! (2002, 88).

Instead, it relied entirely on the UNHCR to secure the camps. Medecins Sans Frontieres situation reports from the time explain: "UNHCR does not want Tanzanian police inside the camp, which we understand, given their typical passivity" (1994). Tanzania also ignored pleas from Rwanda's RPF government and human rights activists to arrest suspected leaders of the Rwandan genocide then living in Tanzania. Dr. Bernard Pecoul, executive director of MSF, observed: "The Tanzanian police are unable to arrest those people, clearly identified, who are responsible for the massacres." Rutinwa and MSF situation reports indicate that Tanzania did not arrest a single person during the lead up to the border closures, despite having the legal authority to do so under

international law after correctly recognizing the conflict as a genocide. The relinquishment of the state's traditional policing responsibilities to the international community and aid organizations followed the well-established pattern in Tanzania of the government taking an increasingly hands off role towards refugees in the decade prior to the conflict. The international donor community reinforced this pattern by relying less and less on local partnerships in the provision of refugee aid. Given Tanzania's passive police mobilization before and after the border closures, internal security explanations of the closure appear to provide empty justifications for endangering refugees.

The Great Lake Crisis presented states with serious external security challenges. While Rwanda and Burundi burned, legitimate fears existed that the conflict would spread to neighboring countries. Research into the contagion effects of civil wars legitimates these concerns (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; Braithwaite 2010; Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008). Fears of conflict diffusion could have been especially powerful motivators for border closure, especially given the Hutu and Tutsi militias' use of refugee camps as bases to resupply, train, and launch raids. Moreover, *genocidaires* lurked behind legitimate refugees they had, in effect, turned into human shields. Referencing these concerns, the Minister for Foreign Affairs described, "the presence of refugees is a source of tensions between Tanzania and Burundi and to a certain extent Rwanda, arising from suspicion that the refugees are regrouping and training in warfare for attacking the countries of origin" (quoted in Rutwina, 297).

Tanzania also had unique reasons to fear that hosting refugees might bring it into conflict with neighboring regional governments; it already had a history of being drawn into conflicts by refugees. The 1970s disputes between Tanzania and Uganda began after Ugandan refugees living in Tanzania attempted to oust Idi Amin by leading raids into Uganda. This soured relations

between the two countries, and eventually culminated in the Uganda-Tanzania War from 1978-1979.

Moreover, Tanzania had long feared that decades of refugee crises were manufactured by Rwanda and Burundi as a way to deal with overpopulation. They theorized that neighboring states sought to encourage large numbers of civilians to seek refuge in less populous neighboring states. A senior official in the Prime Minister's office at the time described this sentiment: "These are funny people [referring to Rwandan and Burundian leaders]. How can a government be indifferent to a situation in which over three million of its people live in exile as refugees?...We think that from time to time they deem it necessary to generate turmoil and conflict and throw some people out to stabilize the ratio of population to land" (quoted in Adisa 1995). However, this is a rather thin and implausible justification for genocide, suggesting that Tanzanian elites again attempted to "oversell" a security justification to the international community.

Whereas Tanzanian elites voiced several external security concerns to justify the border closures, Tanzania's behavior during the lead up and following the closures suggests that this was not their true motivation. Though Brahim notes that "[most] of the refugees came with arms and ammunition," no attempt was made by the border guards or security patrols to disarm refugees (1995). This refusal to demilitarize the refugees occurred despite clear precedence within Tanzanian law to do so. Tanzania's Refugee (Control) Act of 1965, still in force at the time, called for confiscating and impounding refugee weapons, cattle and vehicles. Even more damning, Tanzania actually encouraged Burundian rebel refugees to use Tanzanian bases to train and refinance. Human Rights Watch reported that "rebel soldiers continued to be trained in Tanzanian military bases in 1995 and 1996. Tanzania also permitted Burundian rebel leaders to



solicit support on Tanzanian soil from governments such as Sudan and Iran, which maintain embassies in Dar-es-Salaam” (Human Rights Watch 1999).

In a move that further exacerbated security issues, Tanzanian planners purposefully placed refugee camps in Western Tanzania, thus keeping refugees near Tanzania’s shared borders with their countries of origin. Tanzanian decision makers could have located the refugees away from these shared borders, making refugee involvement in the conflict logistically impossible. They had done so in the past. Between 1960 and 1990, Tanzania used this strategy to spread refugees around the country, mitigating the security concerns created by the refugee camp. The fact that Tanzania chose the hosting strategy least able to contain rebel activity, trained rebels, and refused to disarm refugees demonstrates that Tanzania’s stated motivations and observed behavior did not align in this case.

Another plausible explanation for Tanzania’s turn towards *refoulment* and border closures was the magnitude of the refugee crisis and the impact it had on host countries. During the 1994-1996 period, Benaco, Tanzania’s largest camp, swelled with 350,000 Rwandan and Burundian refugees, and was second in population size only to the capital, Dar-es-Salaam. This camp was only designed to hold 200,000, and quickly became overpopulated. Local papers reported on the squalor of the camps. The *Daily Telegraph* called it “Hell on Earth” (1995). The *Dar-es-Salaam Daily News*, Tanzania’s state paper, remarked upon the smell of human waste that permeated the entire region (1995).

Concentrating the refugees in Western Tanzania also had destabilizing social effects. Refugees outnumbered local Tanzanians by at least 2-to-1 at the height of the crisis in this otherwise sleepy area of the country. Aid convoys economically shocked local markets, radically lowering domestic prices on goods supplied with refugee rations, while sharply spiking regional

prices for un-included goods like fresh vegetables (*Wall Street Journal* 1995). Moreover, Tanzania saw little business from the aid convoys. The Principal Secretary at the Ministry of Home Affairs, noting that Tanzanian manufactures of blankets, soap and bottled water had been bypassed in favor of Kenyan contractors, observed, “We Tanzanians are wondering what we are getting out of all this trouble” (quoted in *ibid.*).

Multiple officials and local papers remarked on the environmental degradation caused by the influx. Commentators in the *Dar-es-Salaam Daily News* argued that “The refugees need poles to build their huts and fuel to cook and trees are being chopped down indiscriminately-the rate of tree cutting grows faster than a bushfire” (1995). The *Daily Telegraph* described, “it is as if a plague of locusts had crossed the land” (1995). The Minister of Home Affairs, Augustine Mrema, voiced his own concerns: “Very soon Kagera and Kigoma [Districts in Western Tanzania hosting the most refugees] risk becoming deserts” (quoted in *Daily News* 1995). Brahim, reporting on the crisis for the government to the international community, observed that “Areas beyond 6km from the camps have been cleared of most or all trees. The refugees walk more than 8km daily from camps to gather wood and grass...subject[ing] the land to erosion and general decline” (1995). Refugees damaged many of the local crops, including bananas, maize, and cassava during their resettlement.

However, changes in Tanzania’s hosting practices during the crisis magnified rather than minimized these destabilizing and environmentally degrading effects, implying that they were not primary drivers of Tanzanian border closures. Before 1988, Tanzania eschewed camps. Since the 1960s, it had allowed refugees to self-settle and integrate into local communities, even granting citizenship rights to many long-term refugees. This meant that the destabilizing effects of refugee inflows were largely mitigated by avoiding the concentration of refugee populations.

Refugees were allowed to become productive and active members of the communities in which they settled, thus avoiding the stigmatizing effects of large refugee camps. However, this inclusive and diffuse policy made it more difficult for aid agencies to service refugee populations, forcing Tanzania to bear more expenses for refugee maintenance than those offered by the camp-model.

Aid agencies implicitly pushed for the shift because they wanted to bypass local governments in the administration of aid. Tanzania's change in hosting practices thus represents attempts to burden share and bargain with the international community for more refugee aid, consistent with my model's empirical implications. One possibility is that Tanzania shifted its hosting policy to the less effective camp model, preferred by international aid agencies at the time, because of the scale of the crisis. However, Tanzania had already shifted towards refugee warehousing in 1988 while responding to much smaller flows (L'Ecluse 2010; Chaulia 2003). Thus, this questionable policy shift began before the massive influx of refugees during the Great Lake Crisis. A joint explanation may be probable: Tanzania likely used border closures *and* camps to bargain with the international community, in part due to the scale of the crisis. The magnitude of the Great Lakes Crisis may have encouraged Tanzania to adopt a more dramatic form of crisis bargaining when negotiating with donors.

Tanzania actively linked the border closures to attempts to negotiate more aid from the international community. Kikwete explained the closure: "The mood of the Tanzanian people towards refugees has changed...Tanzania's generosity should not be taken for granted" (quoted in Edward Mogire, *Victims as Security Threat*, (Ashgate Publishing, 2011)). The country's Prime Minister, Cleopa Msuya, further pointed to the lack of sufficient regional coordination when accounting for the border closure to the UNHCR. Msuya stated, "Tanzania is ready to receive

refugees but first our neighbors settle their own problems” (quoted in *Inter Press Service*, 1995). In the 1990s, Tanzania closed borders, threatened, and occasionally forcibly expelled refugees, but only during periods where the international community flagged in its support for aid (Whitaker, 2008). Beth Whitaker argues:

Senior officials increased their pressure on donors, implicitly threatening to send the refugees home if funding cuts were not reversed. Local representatives pleaded with UNHCR and NGOs for more resources. By all accounts, though, the strongest reaction came from the district commissioner in Kibondo, who threatened to close a refugee camp, declared the local UNHCR head persona non grata, and demanded that WFP distribute full rations until the food ran out (refugees who received nothing would have to go home) (2008, 247).

Once-secret CIA assessments further suggest that funding concerns determined Tanzania’s border policy:

“The Mwinyi government increasingly doubts the international community’s commitment to solving the regional refugee crisis...UNHCR officials are reducing their existing aid programs by about 30 percent. Dar es Salaam points to these developments as indications that the UN is gradually losing interest in easing Tanzania’s burden” (*Africa Review* 1995).

UNHCR assessments also point towards their knowledge of Tanzania’s issue-linkage approach:

Assessing the reasons behind Tanzania’s border closure... UNHCR’s Tanzania BO stressed ‘the lack of recognition by the international community of Tanzania’s sacrifices as reflected in the dearth of financial and other support from the donor countries’...In this sense the border closure can be seen as an attempt at leveraging the international community into action (Long, 2010).

Clearly, the international donor community and Western elites were aware of Tanzania’s issue-linkage within its evolving refugee policy. In interviews with top Ministry of Home Affairs officials, Whitaker further found that without declining aid flows, Tanzania planned to adopt a more welcoming approach (2008, 253).

In addition to validating the assumption that states link funding issues with border closure policy, the Tanzanian case highlights several of the model’s implications. First, border closures

and forced reparations severely threatened refugees, and international organizations responded to the increased risks border closures bore upon this vulnerable group. In several high-profile cases during this period, returned Tutsi were frequently killed while crossing the border into Rwanda. Returned or barricaded Hutu met a similar fate in Burundi. News reports from the time indicate that the border closure trapped 100,000 people attempting to flee Burundi in an area where the Tutsi-dominated Burundi army actively targeted refugees and waged a scorched earth policy to kill and drive them away (*Inter Press Service* 1995). Moreover, it is clear that Tanzania closed its borders specifically due to the refugee and contingent international funding crisis. Tanzania targeted the closures to specific refugee groups. Tanzania received significant criticism over its closed-door policy from the international community. Aid organizations and donors regularly highlighted the humanitarian implications during the Great Lakes crisis, suggesting that they indeed possessed benevolent intentions, if limited resources.

Consistent with the model's equilibrium, border closures effectively attracted additional aid flows. OECD aid statistics note a significant downward trend in real aid distribution throughout the early 1990s. This trend reverses in 1995-1996, closely aligning with Tanzania's refugee border closures. Such a reversal is all the more stunning given that the international community saw itself to be in a post-crisis period at the time. During post-crisis periods, aid generally decreases as international attention moves on to newer emergencies. Many of the newly funded projects further reflected donors' attempts to ameliorate the effects of the refugees on Tanzania. For example, in 1996, following the border closure, Denmark donated its largest share of aid to Tanzania. It funded such projects as the Kibondo Afforestation Project, which planted over 800,000 seedlings to regenerate forests damaged by the refugee influx (Malocho 1998). Around the same time, the UNHCR also shifted policies, from refusing to work with local

NGOs, to launching several trial projects directly with local Tanzanian organizations (Whitaker 2002, 57). Many of these trial projects eventually became long-term projects. This tactical adjustment in the UNHCR's budget and strategy more directly benefitted Tanzanian organizations and businesses. It also represented a major shift in donor policy. During initial donor meetings held to address the crisis in 1994, the aid community soundly rejected this strategy of directly alleviating the effects of refugees on host nations. The *ex post* fears of benevolent donors thus allowed Tanzania to imperil the lives of fleeing people in exchange for more aid, and qualitatively improved aid from the Tanzanian perspective.

Those escaping Burundi had two choices when selecting an asylum country. They could head east and seek shelter in Tanzania, or they could move west and hope for safety in Zaire, like so many others--over a million refugees from Rwanda and Burundi. This makes Zaire the logical second country to consider within a bargaining game over aid disbursement. Alternatively, one might also note extra-regional conflicts that garnered UNHCR and the aid community's concern at the same time, such as the brewing Balkans crisis. Asylum countries hosting European refugees competed for shares of the same limited pool of aid and donor attention. Of course, the conditions within European asylum-granting countries at this time would definitionally be considered a good state of the world relative to African hosts. Tanzania and Zaire had some of the lowest GDP per capita and development indicators in the world. In order to continue analyzing the theory according to its most difficult tests, this analysis will conscribe itself to Tanzania and Zaire's relative states during the lead up to the border closures.

Zaire had long experienced one party rule, lead by Mobutu Seso Seko since the mid-1960s. However, Mobutu was aging. Moreover, with the end of the Cold War, the international community pressured many countries, including Zaire and Tanzania, to offer multi-party

elections in a move towards democracy. While Tanzania's ruling party remained relatively popular and stable during the lead up to multi-party elections, several factions successfully pressured the Mobutu regime to form a coalition government in 1990. However, Mobutu managed to maintain control of the most important institutions within the government. Seeing that the coalition government could not produce actual change, in 1993, Laurent Monsengwo and Etienne Tshisekedi formed a second anti-Mobutu government in Zaire (Dunn 2003). Ethnic Tutsis, living in Eastern Burundi, largely supported the anti-Mobutu cause. The Mobutu regime had significantly curtailed Tutsi citizenship and political rights since the 1980s (Vlassenroot 2002; Bayart 1998).

From the Mobutu regime's perspective, streams of fleeing Hutu's represented an opportunity to gain the upper hand against domestic opposition (Mamdani 2002; Neimann 2007; Tull 2005). While closing the border might have helped Zaire receive more aid, Mobutu would have lost many natural allies in his fight against restive Tutsis. The war shock itself helped determine the relative state of the world for each country. From Mobutu's perspective, Hutu allies who were more than happy to put down Tutsi opposition improved his government's position. Though Zaire and Tanzania were comparatively poor, Zaire's ruling government was in a better state to accommodate large Hutu refugee groups during the phases of the crisis when Tanzania considered, and eventually adopted, its border closure policy.

### **Case Study 2: Macedonia/Kosovo Border Closure**

While there had been long-standing tensions between ethnic Albanians and the more politically dominant Serbians in Kosovo, a perfect storm of conditions fomented a genocidal civil war in 1998. Huge stockpiles of weaponry flowed into Kosovo after Albania's government collapsed in 1997. Albania's looted military hardware helped grow the Kosovo Liberation

Army's (KLA) stockpiles. This provided necessary materials for the KLA to violently challenge Serbian control over the region. Moreover, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia teetered towards its own constitutional crisis in 1997. Protests erupted in Serbia after Slobodan Milosevic's political party attempted to engineer fraudulent election results. In a successful bid to consolidate his power and circumvent term limits, Milosevic changed his title from President of Serbia to President of the Yugoslav Federation. Milosevic, who had long been an ardent Serbian nationalist, bolstered his power by agitating ethnic divides within his country. A series of tit-for-tat operations, largely won by the KLA, transformed the Albanian insurgency into a full scale war in 1998. It quickly bloomed into a major international crisis with U.S.-led NATO launching an air offensive to dampen and keep the conflict from spilling over into neighboring countries.

Prior to the Syrian conflict, The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) claims the Kosovo conflict produced the largest annual exodus of a refugee group in a single year (2012). The conflict generated over 850,000 refugees who fled their homes to avoid NATO bombs and Serbian reprisals in 1999 (Waller et al. 2001, iv; Daalder and O'Hanlon 2001). This represented over 90% of the Kosovar Albanian population according to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2003). The vast majority of these people sought safety in neighboring countries, such as Macedonia and Albania, before either returning to their homes or finding permanent settlement across Europe and North America.

Macedonia closed its border with Kosovo multiple times during the conflict. The first closure came right as the U.S. and NATO escalated the conflict to hitherto unseen levels. Macedonia sealed the border on 23 February 1999. NATO began its aerial bombardment campaign the very next day. The border closure trapped thousands of Kosovar Albanians trying to flee violence with their persecutors and violated International Law against *non-refoulement*.



To resolve the initial border closure, the international community, led by NATO, agreed to help ease the burden of hosting. Donors granted more aid, and established the Humanitarian Evacuation Programme in order to facilitate the management of refugee caseloads to countries within and outside the region (Eggli 2002). Macedonia later employed closures when transfers flagged relative to new refugee inflows to ensure the international community would continue to follow through on its agreements (Williams and Zeager 2004).

Macedonian policy and its attempts to negotiate with the international community violated refugee case management norms enshrined in international law. Macedonia refused to open the border unless the refugee caseload was spread throughout the region. This violated the principle of *First Country of Asylum*, designed to allow refugees to self-determine their safest exit point from a conflict, and to prevent host countries from denying refugees aid (Hammerstad 2014).<sup>2</sup> Macedonia further violated refugee self-determination norms when it bused and airlifted refugees that had successfully crossed into Macedonia to other host countries, often without the refugees' full consent (Greenhill 2010). UNHCR accounts from the time indicate that Macedonian police even coerced and beat refugees to get their acquiescence for these transfers (1999; Suhrke, et al. 2000). These normative violations had significant humanitarian implications in addition to representing an example of international crisis bargaining.

The most prominent example of using refugees as hostages occurred at the Blace border crossing. Macedonia closed its Blace entry point in early April, trapping 65,000 refugees within the border area between Macedonia and Kosovo. The *Associated Press* colloquially named this muddy valley "no man's land" due to the harsh conditions the refugees faced (1999). The area provided no shelter, no food or water outside what the refugees had carried themselves, a

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<sup>2</sup> During the Holocaust, countries notoriously passed the buck when it came to granting asylum to beleaguered refugees.

complete lack of hygiene facilities, and very restricted medical care. Macedonia discouraged aid groups from crossing into the region. Even after Macedonia reopened its border, it only allowed a trickle of people to cross. Thus, tens of thousands of escaping civilians spent several days trapped under unrelentingly dangerous conditions while Macedonia bargained with the international community for more refugee funding (*L.A. Times* 1999).

A final example demonstrating Macedonia's linking of border closures to negotiations over aid occurred on 6 May 1999. A UNHCR report describes the harrowing scene and foreshadows concerns over ethnic cleansing:

UNHCR staff saw about 1,000 refugees forcibly returned to the Yugoslav side of the border Wednesday evening, pushed back first by Macedonian authorities, then by the Serb side. Once they were back in Yugoslav territory, Serbian troops could be seen beating and shoving the refugees until they were out of sight (1999).

Macedonia sought increased funding, but also international aid in relocating refugees to other host countries. During the second day of the closure, Macedonia's Defense Minister Nikola Kljusev stated, "There can be a balance established between a number who are evacuated and the number of refugees who are allowed into our country" (quoted in *Reuters* 1999). Macedonia thus directly linked the May border closure to demands that NATO and the international community make good on earlier negotiations regarding refugee case management.

Donors fully recognized that Macedonia used refugees as hostages in their negotiations. The *New York Times* reported that "Aid workers called the border closing and the Defense Minister's comment the latest examples of the Macedonian Government's using the lives of Kosovar refugees to effectively blackmail aid agencies and Western governments" (1999). Amnesty International argued that Macedonia was "playing politics" with the lives of vulnerable people (1999). Their report argued:

Frequent closures of the border by the Macedonian authorities seem to be used to prompt quicker action in evacuating refugees. It is difficult to measure whether states and international agencies are moving as quickly as possible to evacuate refugees. However, it is clear that the actions of the Macedonian government in *effectively holding to ransom* those waiting on the borders to enter Macedonia violates agreed international standards...In response to pleas for the international community to share responsibility for assisting and protecting those refugees in the region, many countries have provided not only substantial sums of financial aid, but to date, some 39 countries have agreed to evacuate refugees from Macedonia (Amnesty International 1999, 15-16, emphasis added).

Moreover, border closures served as a winning strategy. Macedonia not only managed to extract more financial aid from the international community, but it also achieved important political concessions limiting its responsibilities to admitted refugees. Donor countries and international agencies promised Macedonia an additional \$250 million dollars in aid and suggested more would come to convince Macedonia to reopen the border during the Blace crisis (*N.Y. Times* 1999). On the same day that Macedonia agreed to open its border in May, the World Bank approved a 50 million dollar credit line to the country (Greenhill 2010). During the April closure, NATO built refugee camps at Brazda, Stenkovec, and Neprosteno within a single day. Macedonia reopened the border the day the three camps opened. Macedonia also got the international community to agree to transfer refugees to third countries, creating the HEP. As has been noted above, the HEP represented a significant departure from prior international norms on refugee management. With its hostage strategy, Macedonia extracted a highly unusual and important concession from NATO and donors.

The pessimistic predictions of the model are well illustrated by both Macedonia's and donor states' behavior. The first empirical implication drawn out by the model is that a host country will use border closures early in a conflict. Macedonia shut its doors before NATO bombing even began, and successfully extracted more funding from them as a result. The second

empirical implication supported by the case is that border closures severely threaten escaping populations. Macedonian border closures significantly hurt the welfare of large numbers of refugees. Refugees suffered beatings, prolonged unlivable conditions, and even disappearances when refused entry to Macedonia. Macedonia even literally held 65,000 refugees as hostages between it and Kosovo's border, and barely allowed the international community to monitor or render them assistance. Next, Macedonia linked its closures to aid and policy changes it sought from the international donor community. It was willing to imperil refugees to force greater concessions from donors. The model's real world applicability would be nullified if Macedonia's closures had derived from non-refugee considerations, but that is clearly not the case. The fourth empirical implication is that donors are motivated principally by the desire to ease refugee suffering. Donors cited humanitarian concerns several times when paying Macedonia's *de facto* ransom demands. Last, border closure should be an effective strategy in equilibrium to garner more international support. Each time Macedonia closed its borders, the *ex post* concerns of donors resulted in Macedonia successfully extracting additional resources from the U.S., the UN, NATO, and wealthy European countries.

A careful reader will note that I have only discussed one host country so far. But the game's findings in part derive from the non-cooperative interaction with a second host country. Albania, which also bordered Kosovo, and shared a strong ethnic kinship with the fleeing refugees, is the logical second host country to consider. The model predicts that the host country with the worse conditions will be the country most able to use refugees as hostages to bolster its bargaining power. Based purely on financial capacity, Albania should have been the country to close its borders. Albania was substantially poorer than Macedonia. Albania had spent decades isolated from the world under one of the least transparent communist regimes, crippling its

economy relative to more open Macedonia. Its economy had also been racked in 1997 by the collapse of dozens of Ponzi schemes which collectively duped over 70% of Albanians into investing. A naive analysis would thus claim that Albania faced a bad state of the world, while Macedonia enjoyed a good state of the world.

Such a simplistic analysis fails to account for the financial and political ramifications of war shock itself. Serbian forces targeted ethnic Albanians during the Kosovo conflict. Refugees were nearly universally Albanian. Albania was much more prepared to absorb a huge influx of fleeing co-ethnics. Macedonia, on the other hand, had a delicate ethnic balance of majority Macedonians and minority ethnic Albanians prior to the war. Like other Balkan countries, Macedonian politics featured a dominant ethnic group capturing most institutions and political positions. Though, ethnic Macedonians did begrudgingly share some limited power with the minority community in a tenuous coalition government. Moreover, native Albanians within Macedonia were highly concentrated in the north of the country. Through the '90s, Macedonian Albanians organized several times for regional autonomy and increased protection of minority rights. The Macedonian majority feared that a large influx of Albanian refugees would prompt a secession attempt. Alternatively, they might bolster the Greater Albania movement, which desired to unify all land currently or historically occupied by Albanians into a single state. Polling suggests that a large majority of Albanians in Macedonia (53%), Albania(63%), and Kosovo(81%) support the concept of a Greater Albania (*Gallup* 2010). Some even feared that the war in Kosovo was a direct attempt by Milosevic to destabilize Macedonia into conflict. Abdurauf Pruthi, a former Macedonian politician and political commentator, describes this view: "We are concerned with preserving the stability of the country...We think Milosevic sent the

refugees as a 'special war' against Macedonia. It's obviously an effort to provoke instability here" (quoted in *L.A. Times* 1999).

The war also had a special economic impact on Macedonia. Prior to the war, 2/3rds of Macedonia's trade flowed through Yugoslavia.. Even before the large refugee flows developed, the war had collapsed industry across Macedonia. Macedonia's Interior Minister, Pavle Trajnov, described the conditions at the time, "I think in six months there will be a total collapse of the economy. Then there would be a lot of side-effects for national security, law and order and society" (quoted in *Independent* 1999). He also noted that international banks were reluctant to give credit to Macedonians and that foreign companies had backed out of investment deals. Therefore, the ethnic dimensions of the Kosovo war and Macedonia's unique economic exposure meant that Macedonia experienced a bad state of the world, while Albania could better afford to house other Albanians.

A final possible critique of the model is that Albania was not actually a strategic actor during the crisis. Williams and Zeager argue that any formal model of the Kosovo crisis should exclude Albania (2004). They argue that Albanian policy was fully sincere and expressive rather than strategic in nature. Their criticism ignores the ways in which world state enables or enervates bargaining leverage. My model provides a sound theoretic explanation for Albania's relative quiescence. Considering the highly strategic nature of international politics, researchers should default towards treating all relevant actors as strategic unless compelling evidence suggests otherwise. Moreover, arguing that Albania was not a strategic actor does not reflect historical facts. In an attempt to fully shirk responsibility for refugees, Macedonia argued that all Kosovo refugees should be sent to Albania due to their shared ethnic kinship. President Gligorov suggested that Albania was the only "natural homeland" for Kosovar Albanians (Gorsevski

2012). Macedonia even tried to convince the international community to allow the formation of a transit corridor between Kosovo and Albania through Macedonia, that upon entering refugees would not be considered as first arrivals into Macedonia (International Crisis Group 1998). Albania reacted swiftly and mobilized a diplomatic response that ensured Macedonia could not fully displace the duty of refugee care on to Albania. UNHCR archives note that the Albanian government was “profoundly irritated” by Gligorov’s comments, sparking a multinational diplomatic crisis (Long 2010). Criticizing the Macedonian president’s remarks, Albania’s President Meidani stated, “Albanians, wherever they have been living or are living inside or outside the territory of Albania, they all are in their ethnic territories and every effort to identify the territory of Albania as the only homeland of all Albanians in the region are approaches which not only carry a chauvinistic spirit but they also do not serve the climate of regional cooperation or good neighbourliness” (Albanian Telegraphic Agency 1999).

It took shuttle diplomacy by the United States, NATO and the UNHCR to sooth Albanian concerns and moderate Macedonian demands. If Williams and Zeager’s hypothesis were correct, and Albania did not act strategically when supporting its coethnics and managing the refugee crisis, this interaction would not have required so much diplomatic maneuvering to alleviate.

### **Conclusion:**

This paper has argued that border closures are sometimes an effective strategy in garnering additional aid for refugee-hosting countries. Countries that threaten the lives of incoming refugees and link these threats to demands for more aid regularly receive more funding. The paper has highlighted a Samaritan’s Dilemma model that explains this regularity, and found substantial evidence of refugee-motivated border closures in Macedonia and Tanzania.

Though these cases come from the late 90s, contemporary events continue to bear hallmarks of the Refugee-Hostage Dilemma. With states like Macedonia and Austria presently refusing to allow refugees to pass through their territory towards more welcoming states without increased support, the dilemma continues to influence international refugee flows and policy. Moreover, Tanzania and Macedonia are not unique in using refugees as hostages during aid negotiations. Zaire, Pakistan, and South Africa among many others have used border closures and turn-back policies when discussing aid allocations with the donor community.

What can the aid community do about the existence of the Refugee-Hostage Dilemma? One of the paradoxes identified in the model is that receiving countries are able to leverage humanitarian sentiment for a bolstered negotiating position. Ironically, the donor's desire to help refugees is the very characteristic which winds up further endangering them. Because donor *ex ante* and *ex post* incentives are incompatible, the standard recommendation is to delegate aid disbursement control to an entity or organization without similarly exploitable preferences. To that end, more hardnosed international financial institutions may better address the needs of refugees without imperiling them. For example, the IMF emphasizes stability rather than development or humanitarian preferences. It may therefore serve as a less manipulable aid distribution organization.

Within extant humanitarian organizations, personnel hiring policies placing legal constraints against the reallocation of funds could make initial aid allocations more credible. This strategy has been successfully used within the private sector. Agents with fiduciary responsibilities regularly help manage and control corporate budgets to ensure that company decisions align with investor needs.



A third possible strategy is for donors to determine a fixed amount of aid allocation per refugee, regardless of receiving country. This would reduce the competition to the lowest common denominator that produces border closures. This final strategy has the advantage of further providing stability to the international refugee system, which has been notably lacking since its inception. Per capita refugee funding would further discourage treating refugees from different regions unevenly.

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## APPENDIX 1.1

### BORDERING AUTOCRATS: INCLUSION OF ADDITIONAL CONTROLS

Studies of territoriality and autocratic militarization behavior frequently include a more diverse array of control variables than I have included within my model. Not all of the common controls are appropriate when attempting to determine a causal effect. Nonetheless, my results remain robust to adding many additional controls. Table 2 highlights the sensitivity of my finding to the inclusion of other variables. The entries in each row record the estimated coefficient on the military regime territoriality interaction term. All coefficients are based on adding the indicated variable to my model which includes controls for capabilities and power status. Across all alternative specifications, military regime territoriality retains its statistical significance. Moreover, the direction of the effect of military regime territoriality remains consistent across specifications.

*Ally-* Mutual alliances are thought to influence the onset and escalation of conflict (Huth and Allee 2002). Moreover, country's sharing an alliance with democracies are more likely to democratize as a result of these agreements (Gibler and Wolford 2006). This suggests that alliances may also impact a country's regime type. My *s\_ld\_1* and *s\_ld\_2* variables include a measure of alliance, but to test whether alternative specifications impact my results in substitute an alternative measure. However, my results are unaffected by this alternative specification. I created a dummy variable based on the COW inter-state alliance dataset for if a dyad shares an alliance to test this. This dummy variable is coded 1 if a dyad has any of the following: a defense pact, a nonaggression pact, a neutrality agreement, or an entente.

*Foreign policy preferences-* Since  $S$  is not the only measure of foreign policy preferences, I replaced my  $s\_ld\_1$  and  $s\_ld\_2$  measures with *Tau-glob* within my model (Bueno de Mesquita 1981). *Tau-glob* is a measure of alliance portfolio similarity within a dyad which ranges from -1 (indicating no common ties) to +1 (shares the same set of alliances). I employed EUGene to create this data (Bennett and Stam 2000). Again, military regime territoriality remains significantly related to conflict onset regardless of measure of foreign policy similarity.

*Distance between country 1 and country 2-* Some models of territoriality include both contiguity and a measure of distance between the countries in a dyad. Because distance affects a country's ability to project power, states further apart should be less likely to engage in a conflict. Using Stinnett *et al.*'s measure of logged distance I find that my results are unaffected by this inclusion (2002).

*Economic Openness-* Economic openness may affect leader's foreign policy options and may limit their ability to employ force. Moreover, more economically open countries frequently share foreign policy preferences, diminishing the likelihood of conflict (Gartzke 2007). However, economic openness is also a result of a country's regime type. Several forms of autocracy view market liberalization as diminishing their control over power and enact attempts to block it. Nevertheless, my findings remain unaffected by adding it to my model. Following Lee and Mitchell's example, I measure economic openness as a country's total exports plus its total imports divided by its GDP (2012). Gleditsch's data on trade and gdp are used to form this variable (2002).

*Other MID involvement-* Huth and Allee argue that states will examine each other's behavior in other dyads to lessen their uncertainty over estimates of military strength and resolve (2002). Several scholars have found that MID involvement is an outgrowth of a country's

domestic political structure and I therefore do not include it within my main model. Controlling for it does not impact my findings. I create two variables, one for each state within a dyad, that counts the number of other MIDs they are involved in within that year.

*New Autocratic Regime*- New regimes are especially conflict prone (Colgan 2010; Mansfield and Snyder 2002). Military regimes are especially short lived. It may thus be possible that military regimes spuriously appear to be more territorial. To control for this I create a measure of whether country 1 is a new autocracy. Countries with an autocratic regime 3 years or younger receive a 1 on this dummy variable. Otherwise, countries are coded with a 0. Even accounting for the effects of youthful belligerency, military regime territoriality remains highly significant.

Within my main analysis, I employ non-military/non-personalist/non-single party regimes as the comparison base category. To ensure that my findings for military regimes are not dependent on the reference category, I vary the reference group. Military regime's territoriality remains positively and significantly related to conflict onset when the base regime includes only non-military/non-personalist autocracies (i.e. when I control for initiator democracy). Setting personalism as the base category also does not undermine my findings on military regimes conflict proneness during territorial disputes. Likewise, the impact of military regime territoriality on conflict emerges remains significant both when single party regimes as well as democracies are individually treated as the residual category.

King and Zeng note that standard logistic regression can underestimate probabilities in rare events data (2001). I employ their -relogit- package to account for the fact that far more non-events than events occur within MID data. Military regime territoriality remains robust to this correction.

The autocratic regime literature has yet to universally adopt a single categorization of regime type. I employ Geddes original regime typology since it has been the most widely adopted within published work to date. However, if a typology categorizes differences in personalism and military leadership I am agnostic about employing it, provided it accounts for systematic differences in institutionalization of political transition across regimes. My theory focuses on the fears of irregular removal from office certain leaders face. Weeks (2012) coding of Lai and Slater (2006) typology best matches this theoretical argument since Lai and Slater's original operationalization focuses exclusively on formal executive constraints. Therefore, I repeat my analysis using Weeks typology which codes regimes as *juntas* if they are non-personalist military governments, *strongmen* if a regime consists of a military backed personalist, and *bosses* are personalist civilian regimes. As above, I interact these dummy regime codes with the territorial dispute variable to produce three territoriality regime interaction terms. I then replicate my full model using this alternative coding. Table 3 presents the results. Consistent with my findings, *juntas* are the most territorial regime. Both civilian and military backed personalists involved in a territorial dispute are not significantly associated with the emergence of conflict. Moreover, junta territoriality is significantly different from both strongman territoriality and boss territoriality at the  $p=.05$  level when using a two-tailed test.

<b>Table 2: Autocratic Territoriality and the Initiation of a Militarized Dispute: Alternative Specifications</b>	
<i>Predictor</i>	<i>Coefficient on Military Regime X Territoriality</i>
<b>Alternative Specifications for Foreign Policy Similarity</b>	
Ally- Gibler & Sarkees coding	.747 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>
	(.180)
Foreign policy preferences – Bueno de Mesquita coding	.635 <sup>.001</sup>
	(.184)
<b>Alternative Specifications for Opportunity to Use Force</b>	
Logged Distance between 2 capitals- Stinnett et. al coding	.630 <sup>.001</sup>
	(.187)
<b>Possible Post-Treatment Controls</b>	
Economic openness- Gleditsch coding [exp+imp/gdp]	0.756 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>
	(.189)
Country 1 and 2 involved in other MIDs	.427 <sup>.029</sup>
	(.196)
New Autocratic Regime – based on Geddes coding	.877 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>
	(.184)
<b>Different Base Regime Categorizations</b>	
Controlling for democracy: other autocracy base regime - Geddes coding	.809 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>
	(.185)
Compared to personalist base regime – Geddes coding	0.772 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>
	(.176)
Compared to single party base regime – Geddes coding	.933 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>
	(.172)
Compared to democracy base regime category – Geddes coding	.809 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>
	(.185)
Compared to democracy – Polity IV	.786 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>
	(.189)
Rare events logit	.673 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>
	(.185)

<b>Table 3: Alternative Regime Typologies and Conflict Onset</b>				
<i>Predictor</i>	<i>Geddes Coding (DV: Initiation) 1945-2007</i>	<i>Weeks 2012 Coding (DV: Initiation) 1945-1999</i>	<i>Geddes Coding (DV: Force/War) 1945-2007</i>	<i>Weeks 2012 Coding (DV: Force/War) 1945-1999</i>
Military Regime	.675 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>		.332 <sup>.026</sup>	
Territoriality	(.185)		(.149)	
Personalist Regime	.029 <sup>.864</sup>		.044 <sup>.739</sup>	
Territoriality	(.167)		(.132)	
Single Party	-.407 <sup>.002</sup>		-.206 <sup>.037</sup>	
Territoriality	(.130)		(.099)	
	.488 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>		.621 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	
Military Regime	(.114)		(.071)	
Personalist Regime	.657 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>		.432 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	
	(.088)		(.058)	
Single Party Regime	.502 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>		.436 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	
	(.073)		(.044)	
Junta Territoriality		.664 <sup>.006</sup>		.32 <sup>.105</sup>
		(.240)		(.197)
Strongman Territoriality		.26 <sup>.114</sup>		.067 <sup>.618</sup>
		(.164)		(.134)
Boss Territoriality		-.239 <sup>.119</sup>		-.469 <sup>&gt;.001</sup>
		(.153)		(.112)
Junta		.394 <sup>.002</sup>		.566 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>
		(.126)		(.075)
Strongman		.534 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>		.34 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>
		(.097)		(.069)
Boss		.472 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>		.780 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>
		(.095)		(.052)
Territorial Dispute	1.99 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	1.78 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	1.64 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	1.66 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>
	(.103)	(.087)	(.072)	(.062)
Contiguity	-.627 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	-.656 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	-.517 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	-.536 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>
	(.013)	(.013)	(.008)	(.008)
Claims Years	.016 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	.015 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	.015 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	.016 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>
	(.000)	(.001)	(.000)	(.001)
Minor x Minor Power	-1.33 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	-1.36 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	-1.68 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	-1.57 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>
Dyad	(.067)	(.068)	(.046)	(.047)
Ln(High/Low	-.147 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	-.139 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	-.227 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	-.212 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>
Capabilities Ratio)	(.018)	(.018)	(.012)	(.012)
A's Similarity to	-.161 <sup>.238</sup>	-.208 <sup>.121</sup>	-.276 <sup>.001</sup>	-.401 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>
System Leader	(.137)	(.134)	(.087)	(.083)
B's Similarity to	-.327 <sup>.012</sup>	-.273 <sup>.039</sup>	-.389 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	-.431 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>
System Leader	(.13)	(.133)	(.082)	(.083)
Years without a MID (t)	-.151 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	-.150 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	-.292 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	-.28 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>
	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)
t <sup>2</sup>	.002 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	.002 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	.005 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	.005 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
t <sup>3</sup>	-.000 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	-.000 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	-.000 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	-.000 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)

Constant	-1.16 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	-.859 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	.623 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>	.644 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>
	(.124)	(.113)	(.081)	(.077)
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.3593	.3680	.4082	.4086
Log likelihood	-8820.20	-8243.05	-18065.44	-17310.637
N	1080610	1041001	1080610	1041001

*Notes: two-tailed p-values in italicized super-scripts, standard errors in parentheses.*

*Table 2: Autocratic Territoriality and the Initiation of a Militarized Dispute:*

*Alternative Specifications*

To rule out the possibility that particularly belligerent military regimes drive my result, I drop 3 of the most bellicose military regimes with active territorial disputes. My results are robust to both individually dropping these countries and dropping them as a group.

<b>Table 4: Autocratic Territoriality and the Initiation of a Militarized Dispute: Dropping Outlier Military Initiators</b>	
<i>Country</i>	<i>Coefficient on Military Regime X Territoriality</i>
Argentina (drops 9133 observations)	.753 <sup>&lt;0.001</sup>
Guatemala (drops 9068 observations)	.682 <sup>&lt;.001</sup>
South Korea (drops 8736 observations)	.630 <sup>0.001</sup>
All Three (drops 26937 observations)	.624 <sup>.002</sup>

## APPENDIX 1.2

### BORDERING AUTOCRATS: ENDOGENEITY ANALYSIS

If different regime types make more claims than others, it is possible an endogenous relationship exists between regime type and the militarization of a territorial dispute. To examine the possibility that regime might impact a state's willingness to make a territorial claim, I examined the correlation between regime type and territorial claims initiation. Table 4 presents these correlations. A correlation coefficient can range from 1 to -1, with 1 indicating a perfectly positive relationship between two variables and -1 indicating a perfectly inverse relationship between two variables. Territorial dispute initiation is uncorrelated with autocratic regime type. This suggests that endogeneity is not a problem with these data.

<b>Table 4: Correlation Between Regime Type and Territorial Dispute Initiation</b>				
	Military Regime	Single Party Regime	Personalist Regime	Territorial Dispute Initiation
Military	1.0000			
Single Party	-0.1424	1.0000		
Personalist	-0.0955	-0.2070	1.0000	
Territorial Dispute Initiation	-0.0009	-0.0012	-0.0017	1.0000



## APPENDIX 2.1

### UNSTABLE GROUND: DATA

This appendix highlights all original data collected for paper 2. It lists border closing countries, their targets, and the year dates for the closures.

<b>Table 1: Directed Dyadic Border Closures, 1980-2011</b>					
<b>Closing Country</b>	<b>Target Country</b>	<b>Start/End Date</b>	<b>Closing Country</b>	<b>Target Country</b>	<b>S/E Date</b>
Albania	Greece	1949-1991	Democratic Republic of Congo	Congo	2001
North Korea	South Korea	1953-2004	Democratic Republic of Congo	Rwanda	2001
Bhutan	China	1961-Present	Democratic Republic of Congo	Uganda	2001
USSR	US	1961-1989	Democratic Republic of Congo	Sudan	2001
USSR	Finland	1961-1989	Democratic Republic of Congo	Zambia	2001
USSR	Sweden	1961-1989	Democratic Republic of Congo	Central African Republic	2001
USSR	Turkey	1961-1989	Democratic Republic of Congo	Tanzania	2001
East Germany	West Germany	1961-1989	Democratic Republic of Congo	Burundi	2001
East Germany	Denmark	1961-1989	Democratic Republic of Congo	Angola	2001
Czechoslovakia	West Germany	1961-1989	Thailand	Burma	2001
Czechoslovakia	Austria	1961-1989	Macedonia	Yugoslavia	2001
Hungary	Austria	1961-1989	Liberia	Sierra Leone	2001
Yugoslavia	Austria	1961-1989	Tajikistan	Uzbekistan	2001
Yugoslavia	Italy	1961-1989	Pakistan	Afghanistan	2001
Bulgaria	Greece	1961-1989	Iran	Afghanistan	2001-2002
Bulgaria	Turkey	1961-1989	Israel	Jordan	2001
China	India	1962-2006	Israel	Egypt	2001
United States	Cuba	1963-2011 on	United States	Canada	2001
Algeria	Morocco	1976-1988	United States	Mexico	2001
Spain	Gibraltar/UK	1977-1985	China	Pakistan	2001
Tanzania	Kenya	1977-1983	India	Pakistan	2001-2003
Egypt	Libya	1977-1989	Pakistan	India	2001-2003
China	Vietnam	1980-1983	Somalia	Djibouti	2002
Iraq	Syria	1980-1997	Somalia	Kenya	2002
Syria	Iraq	1980-1997	Somalia	Ethiopia	2002
Thailand	Laos	1980	Burma	Thailand	2002
Paraguay	Argentina	1980	Thailand	Burma	2002
Paraguay	Bolivia	1980	Thailand	Cambodia	2003

Paraguay	Brazil	1980	Cambodia	Thailand	2003
Zambia	Zimbabwe	1980	Turkey	Iraq	2003
Thailand	Laos	1981	Jordan	Iraq	2003
Argentina	Chile	1981	Syria	Iraq	2003
Israel	Jordan	1981	Lebanon	Israel	2003
Jordan	Israel	1981	Iran	Iraq	2003
Kenya	Tanzania	1982	Sudan	Eritrea	2002-2003
Kenya	Somalia	1982	Kyrgyzstan	China	2003
Kenya	Uganda	1982	Spain	Gibraltar	2003
Kenya	Ethiopia	1982	Russia	China	2003
Kenya	Sudan	1982	Dominican Republic	Haiti	2004
Turkey	Soviet Union	1982	Macedonia	Yugoslavia	2004
Israel	Lebanon (UN Peace)	1982	Peru	Bolivia	2004
Ivory Coast	Ghana	1982	Israel	Egypt	2004
Ivory Coast	Guinea	1982	Russia	Georgia	2004
Ivory Coast	Mali	1982	Iraq	Iran	2004
Ivory Coast	Burkina Faso	1982	Iraq	Kuwait	2004
Ivory Coast	Liberia	1982	Iraq	Saudi Arabia	2004
Ghana	Ivory Coast	1982	Iraq	Jordan	2004
Ghana	Togo	1982	Iraq	Turkey	2004
Ghana	Burkina Faso	1982	Iraq	Syria	2004
Ghana	Benin	1983	Syria	Iraq	2004
Ghana	Nigeria	1983	Iraq	Iran	2005
Ghana	Ivory Coast	1983	Iraq	Kuwait	2005
Ghana	Togo	1983	Iraq	Saudi Arabia	2005
Ghana	Burkina Faso	1983	Iraq	Jordan	2005
Tanzania	Kenya	1983	Iraq	Turkey	2005
Tanzania	Uganda	1983	Iraq	Syria	2005
Tanzania	Zambia	1983	Togo	Ghana	2005
Tanzania	Mozambique	1983	Togo	Benin	2005
Tanzania	Burundi	1983	Togo	Burkina Faso	2005
Tanzania	Democratic Republic of Congo	1983	Uzbekistan	Kyrgyzstan	2005
Tanzania	Rwanda	1983	Syria	Iraq	2005
Tanzania	Malawi	1983	Laos	Thailand	2005
Nigeria	Chad	1983	Israel	Egypt	2005
Israel	Lebanon	1983	Egypt	Israel	2005
France	Spain	1984	Jordan	Syria	2005
Lebanon	Syria	1984	Jordan	Iraq	2005
Guinea	Mali	1984	Jordan	Israel	2005
Guinea	Liberia	1984	Jordan	Saudi Arabia	2005
Guinea	Sierra Leone	1984	Afghanistan	Pakistan	2005
Guinea	Ivory Coast	1984	Israel	Egypt	2005
Guinea	Senegal	1984	Iraq	Iran	2006
Guinea	Guinea-Bissau	1984	Rwanda	Uganda	2006
Nigeria	Niger	1984	Egypt	Israel	2006
Nigeria	Chad	1984	Neighbors	Lebanon	2006
Nigeria	Cameroon	1984	Russia	Georgia	2006-2010
Nigeria	Benin	1984	Burundi	DR Congo	2006
Israel	Lebanon	1985	Israel	Egypt	2006

Uganda	Rwanda	1985	Thailand	Burma	2006
Uganda	Kenya	1985	Democratic Republic of Congo	Congo	2006
Uganda	Tanzania	1985	Democratic Republic of Congo	Rwanda	2006
Uganda	Democratic Republic of Congo	1985	Democratic Republic of Congo	Uganda	2006
Uganda	Sudan	1985	Democratic Republic of Congo	Sudan	2006
Liberia	Sierra Leone	1985	Democratic Republic of Congo	Zambia	2006
Liberia	Guinea	1985	Democratic Republic of Congo	Central African Republic	2006
Liberia	Ivory Coast	1985	Democratic Republic of Congo	Tanzania	2006
Egypt	Libya	1985	Democratic Republic of Congo	Burundi	2006
Tunisia	Libya	1985-1986	Democratic Republic of Congo	Angola	2006
Nigeria	Niger	1986	Israel	Jordan	2006
Nigeria	Chad	1986	Israel	Syria	2006
Nigeria	Cameroon	1986	Israel	Egypt	2006
Nigeria	Benin	1986	Israel	Lebanon	2006
Libya	Tunisia	1986	Turkmenistan	Afghanistan	2006
Libya	Algeria	1986	Turkmenistan	Iran	2006
Libya	Sudan	1986	Turkmenistan	Kazakhstan	2006
Libya	Chad	1986	Turkmenistan	Uzbekistan	2006
Libya	Niger	1986	Kenya	Somalia	2006-2007
South Africa	Lesotho	1986	Burma	China	2006-2007
Dominican Republic	Haiti	1986	Ivory Coast	Ghana	2007
Uganda	Sudan	1986	Guinea	Guinea Bissau	2007
Zambia	Zimbabwe	1986	Iraq	Iran	2007
Zambia	Tanzania	1986	Iraq	Kuwait	2007
Zambia	Democratic Republic of Congo	1986	Iraq	Saudi Arabia	2007
Zambia	Botswana	1986	Iraq	Jordan	2007
Zambia	Namibia	1986	Iraq	Turkey	2007
Zambia	Malawi	1986	Iraq	Syria	2007
Zambia	Angola	1986	Indonesia	East Timor	2007
Burundi	Rwanda	1987	East Timor	Indonesia	2007
Burundi	Tanzania	1987	Iran	Pakistan	2007-2008
Burundi	Democratic Republic of Congo	1987	Nigeria	Niger	2007
China	Nepal	1987	Nigeria	Chad	2007
Burkina Faso	Mali	1987	Nigeria	Benin	2007
Burkina Faso	Ivory Coast	1987	Nigeria	Cameroon	2007
Burkina Faso	Benin	1987	India	Nepal	2007
Burkina Faso	Togo	1987	Pakistan	Afghanistan	2007
Burkina Faso	Ghana	1987	Israel	Egypt	2007
Burkina Faso	Niger	1987	Iran	Iraq	2007-2008?
Thailand	Laos	1988	Iran	Afghanistan	2008
Nicaragua	Honduras	1988	Egypt	Israel	2008

Nicaragua	Costa Rica	1988	Israel	Egypt	2008
Turkey	Iraq	1988	Pakistan	Afghanistan	2008
Burma	Thailand	1988	Venezuela	Colombia	2008
Burma	China	1988	China	Nepal	2008
Burma	India	1988	China	Bhutan	2008
Iran	Turkey (Iraq Refugee)	1988	China	India	2008
India	Nepal	1989	Pakistan	Iran	2008
UK	Ireland	1989	Burma	Laos	2008
Ireland	UK	1989	Burma	China	2008
China	USSR	1989	Burma	Thailand	2008
China	India	1989	Burma	Bangladesh	2008
China	Japan	1989	Burma	India	2008
China	Vietnam	1989	Kosovo	Albania	2008
China	Taiwan	1989	China	Nepal	2008
China	Pakistan	1989	Kosovo	Macedonia	2008
China	North Korea	1989	Kuwait	Iraq	2008
China	Mongolia	1989	Iraq	Iran	2008
China	Burma	1989	Sudan	Kenya	2008
China	Laos	1989	Israel	Egypt	2008
China	Nepal	1989	Iran	Iraq	2008
China	Bhutan	1989	Indonesia	Papua New Guinea	2008
East Germany	Czechoslovakia	1989	North Korea	South Korea	2008
Peru	Chile	1989	North Korea	China	2008
Peru	Bolivia	1989	Malaysia	Thailand	2008
Peru	Ecuador	1989	Uzbekistan	Tajikistan	2008
Romania	Yugoslavia	1989	Ghana	Togo	2008
Romania	Hungary	1989	Ghana	Ivory Coast	2008
Romania	Bulgaria	1989	Ghana	Burkina Faso	2008
Romania	Ukraine	1989	Kenya	Somolia	2008-2011
USSR	Poland	1990	Egypt	Israel	2009
Nigeria	Niger	1990	Iraq	Iran	2009
Nigeria	Chad	1990	Iraq	Kuwait	2009
Nigeria	Cameroon	1990	Iraq	Saudi Arabia	2009
Nigeria	Benin	1990	Iraq	Jordan	2009
Kuwait	Iraq	1990	Iraq	Turkey	2009
Kuwait	Saudi Arabia	1990	Iraq	Syria	2009
Iraq	Kuwait	1990-1991	Guinea Bissau	Senegal	2009
Iraq	Syria	1990	Guinea Bissau	Mali	2009
Iraq	Iran	1990	Guinea Bissau	Sierra Leone	2009
Iraq	Jordan	1990	Guinea Bissau	Liberia	2009
Iraq	Turkey	1990	Guinea Bissau	Ivory Coast	2009
Iraq	Saudi Arabia	1990	North Korea	South Korea	2009
Jordan	Iraq	1990	China	Kyrgyzstan	2009
Kuwait	Iraq	1991-2002	India	Nepal	2009-2010
Iraq	Jordan	1991	India	Bhutan	2009
Turkey	Iraq	1991-1996	Uzbekistan	Kyrgyzstan	2009
Slovenia	Austria	1991	China	Kyrgyzstan	2009
Slovenia	Croatia	1991	Gabon	Equitorial Guinea	2009
Togo	Benin	1991	Gabon	Cameroon	2009

Togo	Ghana	1991	Gabon	Republic of the Congo	2009
Togo	Burkina Faso	1991	Zambia	DR Congo	2009
Turkey	Iraq	1992	Niger	Neighbors	2009
Croatia	Bosnia	1992	Papua New Guinea	Indonesia	2009
Ciskei	South Africa	1992	Indonesia	PNG	2009
Turkey	Armenia	1993-Present	Pakistan	Afghanistan	2009
Iraq	Jordan	1993	Afghanistan	Pakistan	2009
Paraguay	Argentina	1993	Iran	Pakistan	2009-2010
Paraguay	Bolivia	1993	DR Congo	Burundi	2009
Paraguay	Brazil	1993	Tajikistan	Kyrgyzstan	2009
Niger	Nigeria	1993	Kyrgyzstan	Tajikistan	2009
Niger	Mali	1993	Niger	Chad	2009
Niger	Chad	1993	Niger	Libya	2009
Niger	Burkina Faso	1993	Niger	Algeria	2009
Niger	Algeria	1993	Niger	Benin	2009
Niger	Libya	1993	Slovakia	Ukraine	2009
Niger	Benin	1993	Venezuela	Colombia	2009
Burundi	Rwanda	1993	Malaysia	Thailand	2009
Burundi	Tanzania	1993	Egypt	Israel	2010
Burundi	Democratic Republic of Congo	1993	Uzbekistan	Afghanistan	2009-2010
Libya	Tunisia	1993	Niger	Chad	2010
Algeria	Morocco	1994-2009	Niger	Libya	2010
Togo	Benin	1994	Niger	Algeria	2010
Togo	Ghana	1994	Niger	Benin	2010
Togo	Burkina Faso	1994	Iraq	Iran	2010
Pakistan	Afghanistan	1994	Iraq	Kuwait	2010
Rwanda	Democratic Republic of Congo	1994	Iraq	Saudi Arabia	2010
Rwanda	Uganda	1994	Iraq	Jordan	2010
Rwanda	Burundi	1994	Iraq	Turkey	2010
Rwanda	Tanzania	1994	Iraq	Syria	2010
Argentina	Chile	1994	Colombia	Ecuador	2010
Argentina	Uruguay	1994	Colombia	Peru	2010
Argentina	Brazil	1994	Colombia	Brazil	2010
Argentina	Bolivia	1994	Colombia	Venezuela	2010
Argentina	Paraguay	1994	Colombia	Panama	2010
Gambia	Senegal	1994	Uzbekistan	Kyrgyzstan	2010-2011?
Democratic Republic of Congo	Rwanda	1994	Chad	Sudan	2003-2010
Israel	Jordan	1994	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan	2010
Jordan	Israel	1994	DR Congo	Uganda	2010
Haiti	Dominican Republic	1994	Afghanistan	Uzbekistan	2010
Haiti	United States	1994	Armenia	Iran	2010
United States	Haiti	1994	Tajikistan	Kyrgyzstan	2010
Greece	Albania	1994	Burma	Thailand	2010-2011
Thailand	Cambodia	1994	Lebanon	Israel	2010
Russia	Georgia	1994	Israel	Lebanon	2010

Russia	Azerbaijan	1994	Pakistan	Afghanistan	2010
Tanzania	Burundi	1995	Iran	Pakistan	2010
Greece	Macedonia	1994	Niger	Chad	2010
Thailand	Cambodia	1995	Niger	Libya	2010
Russia	Azerbaijan	1995	Niger	Algeria	2010
Liberia	Ivory Coast	1995	Niger	Benin	2010
Zaire	Neighboring	1995	Australia	PNG	2010
Macedonia	Albania	1995	Ivory Coast	Liberia	2010-2011
Macedonia	Yugoslavia	1995	Ivory Coast	Guinea	2010-2011
Macedonia	Greece	1995	Ivory Coast	Mali	2010-2011
Macedonia	Bulgaria	1995	Ivory Coast	Burkina Faso	2010-2011
Libya	Egypt	1996	Ivory Coast	Ghana	2010-2011
Libya	Tunisia	1996	Pakistan	Afghanistan	2011
Libya	Algeria	1996	Israel	Egypt	2011
Libya	Sudan	1996	Egypt	Israel	2011
Libya	Chad	1996	Kenya	Somalia	2011
Libya	Niger	1996	Thailand	Malaysia	2011
Burundi	Rwanda	1996	Nigeria	Benin	2011
Burundi	Tanzania	1996	Nigeria	Niger	2011
Burundi	Democratic Republic of Congo	1996	Nigeria	Chad	2011
Iran	Iraq	1996	Nigeria	Cameroon	2011
China	Hong Kong	1996	Chad	Libya	2011
Zaire	Rwanda	1996	Mauritania	Libya	2011
Uganda	Democratic Republic of Congo	1997-2001	Algeria	Libya	2011
Thailand	Cambodia	1997	Australia	PNG	2011
Turkey	Iraq	1997	Syria	Jordan	2011
Sierra Leone	Guinea	1997	Ethiopia	Kenya	2011
Sierra Leone	Liberia	1997	Brazil	Haiti	2011
Liberia	Sierra Leone	1997	Greece	Albania	2011
Solomon Islands	Papua New Guinea	1997-1998	Iran	Iraq	2011
Uzbekistan	Afghanistan	1998-2001	Turkey	Syria	2011
Senegal	Guinea Bissau	1998	Lebanon	Syria	2011
Democratic Republic of Congo	Congo	1998	Israel	Syria	2011
Rwanda	Democratic Republic of Congo	1998	Jordan	Syria	2011
Israel	Lebanon	1999	Iraq	Syria	2011
Paraguay	Argentina	1999	Syria	Turkey	2011
Paraguay	Bolivia	1999	Syria	Lebanon	2011
Paraguay	Brazil	1999	Syria	Israel	2011
Macedonia	Serbia	1999	Syria	Jordan	2011
Hungary	Serbia	1999	Syria	Iraq	2011
Serbia	Albania	1999	Iran	Pakistan	2011
Kenya	Somalia	1999	Tanzania	Zambia	2011
Burma	Thailand	1999	Kenya	Somalia	2011
Guinea Bissau	Senegal	1999	Pakistan	Afghanistan	2011
Guinea Bissau	Mali	1999	Democratic Republic of Congo	Congo	2011
Guinea Bissau	Sierra Leone	1999	Democratic Republic of Congo	Rwanda	2011
Guinea Bissau	Liberia	1999	Democratic	Uganda	2011

			Republic of Congo		
Guinea Bissau	Ivory Coast	1999	Democratic Republic of Congo	Sudan	2011
Iran	Afghanistan	1998-1999	Democratic Republic of Congo	Zambia	2011
China	North Korea	2000	Democratic Republic of Congo	Central African Republic	2011
Israel	Lebanon	2000-2001	Democratic Republic of Congo	Tanzania	2011
Czech Republic	Slovakia	2000	Democratic Republic of Congo	Burundi	2011
Czech Republic	Germany	2000	Democratic Republic of Congo	Angola	2011
Czech Republic	Poland	2000	Tunisia	Libya	2011
Czech Republic	Austria	2000	Libya	Tunisia	2011
Pakistan	Afghanistan	2000	Iran	Iraq	2011
Guinea	Mali	2000-2001	North Korea	China	2011
Guinea	Liberia	2000-2001	North Korea	Russia	2011
Guinea	Sierra Leone	2000-2001	North Korea	South Korea	2011
Guinea	Ivory Coast	2000-2001			
Guinea	Senegal	2000-2001			

## APPENDIX 2.2

### UNSTABLE GROUND: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

I conduct several robustness checks for my modeling choices presented below. These include dropping possible outlier targets and closers.

**Table 1: Directed Dyadic Test of Theories of Border Closures, Dropping Individual Closer Countries**

	Border Closure Presence			
	Iraq	DRC	Israel	All Three
Neighbor Civil War	0.275 <sup>.003</sup> (0.093)	0.196 <sup>.036</sup> (0.094)	0.675 <sup>.004</sup> (0.091)	0.215 <sup>.018</sup> (0.091)
Directed Income Inequality	-0.053 <sup>.277</sup> (0.049)	-0.009 <sup>.850</sup> (0.0492)	-0.070 <sup>.146</sup> (0.048)	-0.022 <sup>.651</sup> (0.048)
Territorial Disputes	1.114 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (0.094)	1.137 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (0.093)	1.109 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (0.093)	1.096 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (0.093)
Democratic Closer/Builder- Autocratic Neighbor	1.175 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (0.135)	1.205 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (0.132)	1.227 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (0.134)	1.215 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (0.132)
Autocratic Closer/Builder- Democratic Neighbor	1.092 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (0.138)	1.096 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (0.135)	1.06 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (0.139)	1.086 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (0.136)
Autocratic Dyad	1.223 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (0.125)	1.208 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (0.123)	1.296 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (0.124)	1.284 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (0.122)
Log of Distance	-0.042 <sup>.391</sup> (0.048)	-0.056 <sup>.244</sup> (0.048)	0.007 <sup>.874</sup> (0.049)	-0.014 <sup>.775</sup> (0.048)
Allies	0.205 <sup>.018</sup> (0.087)	0.248 <sup>.004</sup> (0.087)	0.281 <sup>.001</sup> (0.087)	0.261 <sup>.002</sup> (0.085)
Capability Ratio	-0.067 <sup>.021</sup> (0.029)	-0.083 <sup>.004</sup> (0.029)	-0.085 <sup>.003</sup> (0.029)	-0.084 <sup>.003</sup> (0.029)
Constant	-4.856 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (0.365)	-4.802 <sup>&lt;.001</sup> (0.363)	-5.331 <sup>.001</sup> (0.370)	-5.121 <sup>.001</sup> (0.362)
Dyad Random Effects	No	No	No	No
Dyad Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No
N	27162	27189	27215	26757

*Notes:* two-tailed p-values in italicized superscripts, standard errors in parentheses.



**Table 2: Directed Dyadic Test of Theories of Border Closures, Dropping Individual Target Countries**

	Border Closure Presence		
	Syria	Jordan	Afghanistan
Neighbor Civil War	0.281 <sup>0.002</sup> (0.091)	0.268 <sup>0.003</sup> (0.091)	0.235 <sup>0.011</sup> (0.092)
Directed Income Inequality	-0.063 <sup>0.192</sup> (0.0482)	-0.048 <sup>0.311</sup> (0.048)	-0.058 <sup>0.222</sup> (0.048)
Territorial Disputes	1.13 <sup>&lt;0.001</sup> (0.093)	1.104 <sup>&lt;0.001</sup> (0.093)	1.112 <sup>&lt;0.001</sup> (0.093)
Democratic Closer/Builder- Autocratic Neighbor	1.166 <sup>&lt;0.001</sup> (0.132)	1.184 <sup>&lt;0.001</sup> (0.134)	1.197 <sup>&lt;0.001</sup> (0.132)
Autocratic Closer/Builder- Democratic Neighbor	1.077 <sup>&lt;0.001</sup> (0.135)	1.086 <sup>&lt;0.001</sup> (0.136)	1.087 <sup>&lt;0.001</sup> (0.135)
Autocratic Dyad	1.174 <sup>&lt;0.001</sup> (0.123)	1.259 <sup>&lt;0.001</sup> (0.123)	1.260 <sup>&lt;0.001</sup> (0.122)
Log of Distance	-0.033 <sup>0.365</sup> (0.048)	-0.029 <sup>0.551</sup> (0.048)	-0.030 <sup>0.529</sup> (0.048)
Allies	0.191 <sup>0.026</sup> (0.086)	0.248 <sup>0.004</sup> (0.085)	0.293 <sup>0.001</sup> (0.086)
Capability Ratio	-0.076 <sup>0.008</sup> (0.029)	-0.085 <sup>0.003</sup> (0.029)	-0.089 <sup>0.005</sup> (0.029)
Constant	-4.859 <sup>&lt;0.001</sup> (0.366)	-5.024 <sup>&lt;0.001</sup> (0.363)	-5.032 <sup>&lt;0.001</sup> (0.362)
Dyad Random Effects	No	No	No
Dyad Fixed Effects	No	No	No
N	27216	27270	27249

*Notes:* two-tailed p-values in italicized superscripts, standard errors in parentheses.